

CONFIDENTIAL.

EXPEDITION

M. 606.

AGAINST THE

BLACK MOUNTAIN TRIBES

BY A FORCE UNDER

MAJOR-GENERAL J. W. McQUEEN, C.B., A.D.C.,

IN

1888.


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(UNDER THE ORDERS OF THE QUARTER MASTER GENERAL IN INDIA)

BY

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


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PREFACE.

The following account of the late expedition against the tribes of the Black Mountain is compiled from official sources. The history of our dealings with the tribes on this border, and the events which led up to the expedition, are given somewhat in detail, in order to complete the history of this frontier from the 1st April 1884, the date up to which the account is brought in the "Record of Expeditions against the North-West Frontier Tribes," compiled by Lieutenant-Colonel Paget, 5th Punjab Cavalry, in 1873, and revised and brought up to date by myself in 1884. It is intended that when another edition of the abovementioned work is published, the following history of the Hazara Expedition of 1888 shall be incorporated in it.

Owing to the map which accompanies this report being, under the orders of the Government of India, "confidential," it has been necessary to make this report also "confidential."

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Hazara Field Force.
1st April, 1889.

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THE history of the tribes of the Black Mountain and adjacent independent territory has been brought up to the 1st April 1884, in the "Record of the Expeditions against the North-West Frontier Tribes," and it is now proposed to describe the subsequent events which have happened on this border, and which culminated in the Black Mountain Expedition of 1888.

Introduction.

To thoroughly understand the position of affairs on the Agror frontier previous to the despatch of the punitive expedition in October last, it will be necessary to enter somewhat in detail into the history of the several tribes on this border since the 1st April 1884.

To commence with the Allaiwals. At the beginning of 1884, this tribe was still under blockade, as the terms imposed on them in 1880 had not been fulfilled. A fine of Rs. 5,000 was still outstanding on account of the raid on Battal in 1877, and a further fine of Rs. 500 was due for the attack on Mr. Scott's survey party in 1868. Moreover Arsala Khan, the Allai chief, had not come in and made his submission in accordance with the orders of Government. At the beginning of 1884, this chief had assumed a somewhat more conciliatory attitude and owing to his quarrels with Muzaffar Khan of Nandihar, who was his rival, he was too much occupied to give trouble on the border.

Allaiwals.

In August 1885, peace was made between Arsala Khan and Muzaffar Khan, but soon after difficulties arose between the former and his cousin and rival in Allai, Bahadur Khan of Shakargah. The Musa Khel section of the Allaiwals sided with Bahadur Khan and in March 1886, Arsala Khan lost four men wounded in an attack on a fort which the Musa Khels were building. The attack failed and Arsala Khan was repulsed. Subsequently Arsala Khan and Bahadur Khan made friends, but the latter continued to show his hostility, aiming at supplanting Arsala Khan and professing to be the good friend of the British Government.

During the autumn of 1886, reports from all quarters agreed that Arsala Khan, in order to attract attention and increase his own importance, was preparing to raid on one of our frontier villages, probably Battal or Jabbar. A few police were moved to the village of Shinkiari and kept there till the first fall of

snow in December rendered the chances of an attack improbable. Gunpowder and lead were also served out to villagers possessed of matchlocks.

After the peace made between Arsala Khan and Muzaffar Khan, mentioned above, they combined to oppose Ghafar Khan of Trand and they supported the Sarkheli Swatis in an attack on the village of Thakot, which they burnt. In March 1887 they again attacked Thakot, but the Argoshal Swatis of Thakot, assisted by Ghafar Khan of Trand, beat off the attack.

On the 4th July 1887, two raids were committed simultaneously on the northern corner of the Bogarmang glen above Jabbar, on small grazing camps in our territory. Some British subjects and cattle were carried off and a party of raiders under Mukaddas, a Mada Khel Allaiwal, were pursued and engaged by the people attacked, and from this party the women and the cattle seized were recovered in the fight which took place. One woman and three men were wounded on our side and on the side of the raiders one man was shot dead and some others were wounded.

The cause of the raid was that during the previous year, Mukaddas had brought a claim in our courts against a Hindu of the Hazara district, which, after enquiry, was dismissed. As a protest against this decision this double raid was planned and carried out. On the 6th August, the Deputy Commissioner reported that Arsala Khan of Allai had compelled Mukaddas Khan to return all the property seized in these raids, together with the captured British subjects, and that they had been made over to the *tahsildar* at Mansera in safety, on the 23rd July. It subsequently appeared that some part of the property was not recovered. It was then proposed to Arsala Khan, of whom Mukaddas Khan was a supporter and partisan, that the case dismissed by the courts should be reopened by being referred for settlement to a council of elders. But Arsala Khan refused to accept this proposal unless a substantial award in his friend's favor was guaranteed by the Deputy Commissioner, which of course was impossible. It seems that the cattle and goods recovered from that which had been carried off was valued at Rs. 2,900 out of a total value of Rs. 3,585. Ransom money, blood money for the woman (who subsequently died of her wounds), and compensation to the wounded men raised the total claim against Mukaddas to about Rs. 1,000. This amount, together with the Rs. 5,500 already outstanding, made the total sum due from the tribe at the time of the expedition in October last Rs. 6,500, and as no other means of recovering this amount remained, punitive measures were then sanctioned, but these were more especially directed against Arsala Khan and his village of Pokal as will be shewn hereafter.

Since 1884, the Nandiharis have given us little cause of offence. As already mentioned the quarrel between Muzaffar Khan, the Nandihar chief, and Arsala Khan of Allai, was brought to a close in 1885. Muzaffar Khan was a British *jagirdar*, resident trans-border. After the peace made with Arsala Khan (which was considered a disgraceful one on the part of Muzaffar Khan), the men of Nandihar quarrelled with the Deshiwals, owing to a dispute about land. There were several fights between the two factions, with losses on both sides; but Muzaffar Khan was in every case worsted.

At the beginning of 1887, Muzaffar Khan in concert with his former enemy, Arsala Khan, made an attack on Ghafar Khan of Trand, as already related.

On the night of the 30th April 1887, a raid was committed on the British border village of Chapri by men of the independent villages of Banser and Shamlai in Nandihar. Of Chapri, one man was killed and three wounded. It subsequently appeared that British subjects from Agror and elsewhere had taken the

initiative, and had first raided upon independent territory, seriously wounding or murdering four persons, and the attack on Chapri was carried out in retaliation for this. The property carried off from British territory was subsequently recovered, and a settlement of all claims on account of the raid was effected.

Since 1884, the old standing feud between Abdul Ghafar Khan of Trand, the head of the Ashlor Naror section of the Tikariwals, and Rahim Khan of Chirmang, the chief of the Malkal section, had led to fighting. During the past few years, the affairs of Abdulla Khan, late of Dilbori (see page 5), had, however, engrossed a good deal of the attention of Ghafar Khan of Trand, who is his father-in-law, but the feud with Rahim Khan was still prosecuted.

In October 1885, a deputation consisting of men of Deshi and Tikari came in, and a settlement of outstanding claims was made with both these tribes.

In December 1887, a blockade was instituted against the Swatis inhabiting Tikari in consequence of the kidnapping of one Jowahir, Khatri, of Mansera, in British territory, who was subsequently set free on the payment of a ransom. In consequence of the blockade, a *jirga*, representing all the sections of the tribe, came in and paid up Rs. 700, the amount of the ransom extorted and property stolen from the Hindu.

There was, however, another case outstanding against Rahim Khan of Chirmang, whose tenantry and servants joined in the Bagrian raid on the 11th July 1887 (see page 9), and this case was unsettled at the time of the expedition in 1888.

At the beginning of 1884, the Deshiwals had (as mentioned in the "Record of Expeditions") committed two small raids on hamlets of Agror. The first of these was committed on Nimbai and the second on the hamlet of Bangala. In the latter raid they lost one man killed and some five men wounded. The tribe was at that time split up into two factions, one of which sided with Abdul Ghafar Khan of Trand and the other with Rahim Khan of Chirmang, and owing to their differences there was some delay in getting the *jirga* of the tribe to come in to answer for their misconduct.

In June 1884, the *jirga* arrived, and they then promised to restore the property not already returned, to send in the actual offenders in the raids mentioned above, and to pay a fine of Rs. 200. They did not, however, fulfil any of these engagements, and the District Officer took occasion when the *jirga* came in in March 1885, to realize the fine due from them. In consequence of this the tribe threatened again to raid on British territory, and about half of them joined Arsala Khan of Allai against Muzaffar Khan of Nandihar, because they alleged the latter was in some way responsible for the displeasure into which they had fallen with the British Government. In October 1885, a deputation of the tribe came in and a final settlement of all outstanding claims was effected, and no further trouble was, after this, given by the tribe.

At the beginning of 1884, there was a fine of Rs. 2,000 outstanding against Hashim Ali Khan (the chief of the Khan Khel Hassanzais and the nominal *Khan* of the whole Isazai clan), for the raid on Kalakka in March 1883 (see "Record of Expeditions"), and the Hassanzais had been informed that they would be held responsible for their chief's good conduct. Subsequent to this, as a tribe, they continued to behave well. During the disturbances on the Agror border in 1884, a few of the Khan Khel section joined in the attack upon Belian on the

19th June (see below), but the remainder of the tribe was actively hostile to these few detached members of one section.

The Hassanzais as a whole remained true to their engagements with the British Government and resisted all attempts to induce them to join the other tribes who had taken up the cause of Abdulla Khan of Dilbori, and up to the end of 1887 the conduct of the tribe gave little cause for complaint.

At the beginning of 1884, the question of the cultivation of the Shatut lands was still pending with the Akazais. Under certain conditions the British Government had consented to the reoccupation of these lands by the tribe, but a small section, headed by Zarif Khan, Painda Khel, refused to accept the proposed arrangement. On the 7th May 1884, Zarif Khan's party raided and burnt down the houses (with the exception of one house and a mosque) which had recently been built in Shatut. Under these circumstances the offer of the Government to restore Shatut remained in abeyance. The Akazais committed themselves during 1884 on the side of Abdulla Khan of Dilbori, a cousin of the Khan of Agror (see page 5), and they attacked Belian in Agror on the night of the 12th May 1884, in conjunction with the Parari Saiads and others, led by a brother of Abdulla Khan. The raiders were driven off and the Belian men lost one or two wounded. In this raid there were only some 20 or 30 Akazais present,* and Zarif Khan refused to connect himself with the movement.

On the 19th June 1884, a second attack was made on the village of Belian. The attacking party was led by Ghazi Khan, brother of Abdulla Khan, and consisted of 40 men of the Khan Khel Hassanzais and some 400 Akazais, belonging indifferently to all four sections of the tribe; this number included Gujars and other tenants of the Akazai land-owners who took part in the fight. On the morning of the 19th June, the raiders moved down to Barchar.

The villagers of Barchar are Akazais and Gujars; they pay an annual rental to the Khan of Agror, and are considered neutrals in all fights between the Black Mountain tribes and the Swatis. As soon as the raiders were seen moving on Barchar, the men of Belian moved out of their village and took up a line of defence about 200 yards up the hill. Their strength consisted of about 80 men belonging to the village and 60 men in the service of the Khan of Agror. Half the number were armed with firearms and the remainder with swords and shields. Reinforcements were sent for, and continued to arrive, consisting at first of villagers and later on of police and military from the Ughi post. The last named held a position in support at the foot of the hill.

The raiders took up a position opposite the men of Belian, and a steady fire was kept up for some time. About 11 o'clock a party of raiders led by Ajmir, son of Zarif Khan, Akazai, advanced down the hill and attacked the left of the Belian line. The Swatis, *urged on by their women and children*, left their position and met the raiders sword in hand. The scene then became one of indescribable confusion; but the result was that the raiders were driven back to Barchar, and eventually retired up the spur, leaving three of their number dead on the field.

The casualties on the side of the Swatis (men of Belian) were four killed and fourteen wounded, and on the side of the raiders four killed and sixteen wounded.

In consequence of these raids the Akazais were placed under blockade in common with the Parari Saiads and the Chagarzais, and the Nawab of Amb

* The remainder being Parari Saiads and their Chagarzai tenants (see page 6).

undertook in his jurisdiction to blockade the tribe in co-operation with the British authorities.

The Akazais aided the Chagarzais in their attack on Ghanian on the 12th September 1884, and took part in the fight on the following day in which the hill men were driven back and dispersed by the small detachment under Lieutenant A. A. Barrett (see page 7).

In November 1884, Zarif Khan died.

When the Parari Saiads and the Chagarzais made their submission in October 1885, they were not joined by the Akazais, who, on the 3rd November and the 4th December 1885, committed raids on Agror. These raids were made on outlying hamlets on the slopes of the Black Mountain. They were more in the nature of demonstrations and but little harm was done. The explanation given of these raids was that the faction of the Akazais which sided with the Khan of Agror raided in order to prevent the faction which sided with Abdulla Khan, late of Dilbori, from coming to terms, from which the Khan of Agror's faction would be excluded. This explanation, however, was not a satisfactory one, as the Akazais had been repeatedly informed that no *jirga* not representing the whole tribe would be treated with.

The blockade imposed upon the Akazais continued in force, but it did not press on them so heavily as in the case of the Chagarzais and Parari Saiads, no members of their tribe having been detained nor had any of their property been confiscated. They were able to obtain their supplies through the Hassanzais and Mada Khels, and the blockade did not really injure them, excepting that they had to pay a little more for salt and other supplies.

During 1886 and 1887 the Akazais continued under blockade, but did not give trouble tribally; individuals, however, were accused in two or three cases, one of which was a murder.

The Chagarzais for several years previous to 1884 had given no trouble on our border. The Parari Saiads had also

Chagarzais and Parari Saiads.

behaved well, and, with the exception of an

attack on the village of Bagrian in 1881, in pursuance of a private quarrel, no raids had been committed by them in our territory for many years.

In 1884, however, the Parari Saiads with their Chagarzai tenants commenced to cause disturbances and several raids were undertaken in the cause of Abdulla Khan of Dilbori. In order to better understand the dispute between Abdulla Khan of Dilbori and the Khan of Agror, which led to the subsequent disturbances on the Agror frontier, it is necessary to enter somewhat in detail into the history of the former. He is a cousin of the Khan of Agror on both sides of the family. Aladad Khan, the father of Abdulla Khan, acted as guardian and protector to the late Khan of Agror (Ata Muhammad Khan) during his minority, before the annexation of the Punjab. During the troublous times which preceded the Black Mountain Expedition of 1868, Aladad Khan was selected to manage part of the Agror valley, superseding to some extent the late *Khan*, his former ward. This, combined with other circumstances, did not improve their mutual relations; and when Ata Muhammad Khan returned from Lahore (where he was kept as a political prisoner from 1868 to 1870) Aladad Khan was in opposition to him. Eventually in the course of the Agror settlement, the Khan of Agror was declared the sole proprietor of the valley; and Aladad Khan then made his submission to him and received from him on lease,

Kabul Pain.

Dilbori.

Pir Patta.

Trawora.

Kungali.

Part of Ghanian.

subject to a rental of Rs. 400 a year, the six villages named in the margin. Aladad Khan was succeeded by Abdulla Khan, and Ata Muhammad Khan by his selected

son, Ali Gauhar Khan, the present Khan of Agror. On the 7th December 1882, the latter presented a petition to the Deputy Commissioner requesting that Abdulla Khan might be deprived of the lease of these villages. It appeared that the reason for the bitterness between the two *Khans* was that Abdulla Khan had allied himself with the Akazais and other hillmen in opposition to the Khan of Agror; that the former had rendered service to the Government in bringing in the Parari Saiad and Akazai *jirgas* against the real wishes of the *Khan*; and, lastly, that the villages leased to Abdulla Khan for Rs. 400 *per annum* were worth at least seven times this amount. Abdulla Khan was at this time in the receipt of a cash allowance of Rs. 592 *per annum* from the British Government. On the 14th April 1884, in direct violation of a promise he had given to the District Officer, Abdulla Khan, without any previous warning, left Dilbori and crossed the frontier to Bilandkot in independent territory belonging to the Parari Saiads. He was accordingly informed that if he lent himself to any disturbances on the border, directly or indirectly, his cash allowance would be confiscated, and he himself would be liable to punishment.

On the 5th May 1884, some partisans of Abdulla Khan among the Parari Saiads and Chagarzais burnt Abdulla's house at Dilbori, and the following day a party consisting of some 40 men burnt two houses in Talwari, another village in Agror, the damage done being reported as trifling. In consequence of these raids the garrison of Ughi was increased, and the Commissioner was instructed to take such steps as might appear necessary for the protection of the border.

On the night of the 9th May, six houses were burnt by the partisans of Abdulla Khan in the villages of Talwari and Charkot. On the following day, it being reported that a large body of raiders was collected on the Kungali spur, Lieutenant-Colonel J. M. Sym, 5th Gurkhas, with 115 Gurkhas and 35 police moved out from Ughi and occupied Dilbori. On his arrival at this place Colonel Sym found a desultory sort of fight going on above the village between some four or five hundred hillmen (Parari Saiads and Chagarzais) and about eight hundred of the Khan of Agror's levies. As the latter seemed quite able to hold their own, and nothing would have been gained by attacking the enemy whose line of retreat was open up the spur of the Black Mountain in their rear, Colonel Sym, after occupying Dilbori for about two hours, slowly withdrew the troops.

In the fighting the Khan of Agror had one man killed and four wounded, and the raiders were dispersed with three men wounded.

It was now decided in consultation between the military and the civil authorities—

(1) To leave the defence of the Agror border for the present to the Agror levies supported by troops.

(2) To occupy the Susal pass leading into Agror by levies from Mansera, so as to set free the Khan of Agror's men.

(3) To call on Samandar Khan, *jagirdar* of Garhi Habibulla, to take measures to protect Konsh from attack.

The district authorities at the same time reported that the *Khan's* levies were untrustworthy, and that most of the inhabitants of Agror preferred Abdulla Khan to the Agror chief.

On the night of the 12th May, the village of Belian was attacked by a party of raiders including a small contingent of some 20 or 30 Akazais, led by a brother of Abdulla Khan. The raiders were driven off, and the Belian men lost one or two wounded. On their way back the marauders set fire to the village of Bholu.

Some men of the Parari Saiads again fired Talwari on the night of the 13th May, and on the 17th May, a brother of Abdulla Khan and some Saiads burnt the empty houses in the hamlet of Pir Patta. Attempts were now being made by Abdulla Khan to get the main body of the Chagarzais to assist him. Up to this time it appears that only the members of this tribe who lived in Parari as dependents of the Saiads had joined in the raiding on British territory. On the 24th May, three cattle enclosures in Ghanian were burnt by Parari Saiads, Abdulla Khan's brother, Mir Zaman, being present.

On the 19th June, the Parari Saiads and Chagarzais made an attack on Dilbori, while the Akazais and Khan Khel Hassanzais attacked Belian, as already related. The attack on Dilbori was badly managed and ill-sustained, and the raiding party, under Abdulla Khan himself, was driven back over Mana-ka-Dana and out of British territory. No casualties were reported on either side.

In consequence of these repeated outrages on the Agror border, orders were issued in July 1884, for the confiscation of the allowance (Rs. 592) granted to Abdulla Khan, and he was at the same time proclaimed an outlaw guilty of murder and debarred from British territory until he was either captured as a criminal or should come in as a suppliant to sue for mercy.

At the same time the Parari Saiads with their Chagarzai tenants were ordered to be placed under blockade. At the beginning of September 1884, reports were received of the arrival of a large body of Chagarzais in the Parari country. They belonged to the Basi Khel section of the tribe, and their numbers were estimated at between 300 and 400 men. In consequence of these reports advantage was taken of the relief of the Ughi post, to detain the old garrison, thus raising the strength of the post from 100 to 200 rifles.

On the 12th September, some 1,000 Chagarzais joined by Akazais and others with standards collected on the spurs of the Black Mountain above the villages

2nd Sikh Infantry	75 rifles.
5th Gurkha Regiment	75 "
Police	25 "

of Ghanian and Dilbori, about four miles distant from Ughi. Accordingly the detachment, strength as per margin, under the command of Lieutenant A. A. Barrett, 5th Gurkhas, moved out from the Ughi post at 11 A.M. to a point equi-distant from the above villages, about a mile from each, and there watched the enemy, who did not descend from their position until about 5 P.M., when Lieutenant Barrett, with Mr. R. Clarke, the Deputy Commissioner, had approached the village of Ghanian with a small escort of police. Lieutenant Barrett at once sent for 20 rifles, and three volleys from them had the effect of driving back the Chagarzais, who retired carrying off two of their number killed. The approach of darkness obliged the troops to return to Ughi for the night; and after dark the Chagarzais made an attack on Ghanian, but were repulsed by the inhabitants, this village having been lately fortified for self-defence.

At 5 A.M., on the 13th, Lieutenant Barrett, with the same force as before, returned to Ghanian, accompanied by the Deputy Commissioner, and finding that the enemy had failed in their attack, determined to assault their position. Leaving 30 rifles in the village as a reserve and detaching the police to a hamlet on his left flank, Lieutenant Barrett, with 120 rifles, advanced towards the spur, in front of the village. In moving forward he was obliged first to descend into an intervening ravine, and seeing this the enemy mistook his intention and imagined he was retreating. They, accordingly, advanced down another spur but were met by the fire of the police detachment, who had been joined by the men of Ghanian. Meanwhile the Deputy Commissioner had directed the Khan of Agror's men to advance from Dilbori towards the Kungali pass on which were a large number of standards.

On reaching the crest of the ridge Lieutenant Barrett came in sight of the enemy ; but at his first volley they dispersed, and, seeing the simultaneous advance of the Agror levies and the police, they abandoned their whole position, and eventually disappeared from the hills, making for their own homes.

Thus before 11 A.M. the whole force of 2,000 men were cleared off the hills by the determined conduct of the small detachment of troops, aided by the police and levies. There were no casualties on our side, and, beyond a few houses partially burnt in Ghanian, no injury was inflicted on Agror by this raid. The enemy's loss was estimated at 6 killed and 20 wounded.

After the enemy had been dispersed, the Deputy Commissioner with Lieutenant Barrett and some police and levies advanced to the independent village of Miran belonging to the Parari Saiads, and occupied it without resistance. The Deputy Commissioner explained to the *maliks* how completely they were at the mercy of Government, and the party then returned to British territory taking with them an influential *malik* as a hostage.

In forwarding his report of this affair, Lieutenant Barrett specially brought to notice the conduct of Rahmatulla Khan, Deputy Inspector of Police, who was in command of the police detachment.

The Lieutenant-Governor considered that the spirited conduct of this affair was most creditable to Lieutenant Barrett, and he expressed his entire approval of the proceedings of Mr. R. Clarke, the Deputy Commissioner.

In consequence of this raid the Chagarzais as a tribe were included in the existing blockade of the Akazais and Parari Saiads. On the afternoon of the 5th November, the Saiads of the village of Chōrkalan sent information to say that the Chagarzais were collecting to attack Ghanian, Jaskot or Dilbori, it was not known which. The threatened villages were at once reinforced by the Agror levies. The same night Dilbori was attacked, but the defenders succeeded in repelling their assailants, and when the Ughi garrison and the police turned out at daylight to proceed to the assistance of the village, the raiders had disappeared. The enemy left behind them four men dead, and are said to have carried off two corpses and four wounded men. On our side four were killed and one severely wounded. The attacking party consisted of some two or three hundred Chagarzais and Parari Saiads, and included Abdulla Khan and his brothers. The object of the raid was said to be a desire on the part of these tribes to wipe out the disgrace of their defeat on the 13th September. If so, they entirely failed in their object, as they were repulsed by the villagers and the *Khan's* levies without the aid of the troops or police.

After this raid there were rumours of another intended attack, but this came to nothing, the raiders being afraid of being caught by snow upon the mountains.

At the end of the year 1884, the Chagarzais and the Parari Saiads were still under blockade. During the year 1885, it became apparent that these tribes were losing heart in the cause of Abdulla Khan, and in October of that year full *jirgas* of the Chagarzais and Parari Saiads arrived at Abbottabad for the purpose of making their submission. A settlement was arrived at, and a fine of Rs. 800 was imposed on the Chagarzais and Rs. 600 on the Parari Saiads. These fines were paid on the 13th January 1886, and the thirty members of the two tribes who had been detained, under the blockade, at Rawal Pindi since March 1885, were released. Both tribes gave hostages for their future good behaviour, and these were sent to Abbottabad. They were at the same time informed that they would be held responsible for the good conduct of Abdulla Khan and his brothers across the border. The blockade against the Chagarzais was successful mainly owing to the co-operation of the Nawab of Amb, who

closed Darband to them, thus shutting them out of the only market in British territory still open for them.

During the year 1886 neither the Chagarzais nor the Parari Saiads committed any offence on our border. The former, however, besides giving an asylum to Abdulla Khan, ostentatiously espoused his cause, and several times during the year they sent down representatives and small deputations to intercede for him, and asserted that the Deputy Commissioner had promised to return them the fine they and the Parari Saiads had paid (Rs. 1,400), and to restore Abdulla Khan to favour. It is hardly necessary to say that no such promise had been given. There is no doubt that the Chagarzais, as well as some of the other Black Mountain tribes, felt strong sympathy for Abdulla Khan, and were ready, if it were not for fear of the consequences and the difficulty of united action, to create disturbances in his favour. The Parari Saiads, during 1886, did not identify themselves with the cause of Abdulla Khan to the same extent as the Chagarzais, and in September they visited the Deputy Commissioner at Abbottabad. Mian Saiad, the headman of the tribe, was betrothed to the Khan of Agror's sister, but the *Khan* was delaying the marriage probably because the Saiads were favourable to the cause of Abdulla Khan.

Towards the end of 1886, however, it became apparent that the lenient treatment adopted in the settlement of 1885 had failed, and the Chagarzais when they realized that Abdulla Khan and his family would obtain nothing from Government, sent insulting and menacing letters to the Deputy Commissioner.

On the 11th July 1887, a raid was made on the village of Bagrian. The attacking party consisted of Abdulla Khan, with three of his brothers, and Shah Saiad, Chagarzai, with a following of 40 to 60 men. The raiders drove off the cattle of the village, but the villagers turned out in pursuit and pressed the marauders so hard, that the latter killed eleven of the buffaloes about one mile from Bagrian. Near the Jal pass, the villagers rescued the remainder of the cattle which were being carried off. The raiders had three of their number killed, and the pursuers lost two killed. The loss of the cattle was estimated at Rs. 400, and blood money for lives lost at Rs. 600. In consequence of this raid, a *baramta** was announced against the persons or property of the Parari Saiads and their Chagarzai tenants; and the son of Abdulla Khan, who was being educated by the Government at Abbottabad at an expense of Rs. 20 a month, and who had been received as a hostage for the good conduct of his father after the settlement of 1885, was ordered to be sent across the border under suitable escort, as it was considered that the above raid had proved him to be useless for the purpose for which he had been received.

On the morning of the 21st August 1887, Nur Jamal of Ghanian, while watching his crops, was shot at and killed by an armed party composed of Chagarzai tenants of the Parari Saiads. In consequence of this murder the hostages of the Parari Saiads were incarcerated in jail and an additional fine was imposed on the tribe.

With regard to the Agror valley itself, the disturbances on its border during the year 1884, which have been described above, led to the better arming of the valley and the organizing of the inhabitants for its protection, and the rendering defensible certain of its more important and most exposed villages. Smooth-bore carbines were issued from the police magazine, when the valley first became subject to attack from the trans-border tribes, and in December 1884, 200 Enfield rifles

Improvements in the defences of the Agror valley.

* A *baramta* means the seizure of property or persons of an offending tribe in retaliation for injuries received.

were issued, whilst 118 carbines were still left in use. The villages rendered defensible were Bagrian, Jaskot, Ghanian, Belian, Dewal, Kewal and Dilbori.

The following year (1885), witnessed a further advance in the internal defence of the Agror valley, and at the end of the year the Deputy-Commissioner was able to report that the *Khan* had a body of 100 men, armed with Enfields, who were dressed in uniform and well disciplined. They could shoot fairly well and had been put through target practice by the native officer of the 2nd Sikhs, commanding at Ughi. The 30 police stationed at Ughi had also been armed with Enfields and 70 of these rifles had been distributed to the villagers. All the principal villages had been walled and provided with loopholed towers, the roads had been repaired, and the villagers taught to rely upon themselves. The Commissioner reported that these measures had produced a very remarkable and most satisfactory change in Agror. In June 1887, the Khan of Agror received the honorary title of *Khan Bahadur*, and an allowance of Rs. 2,000 *per annum* from the revenue of Agror.

The history of our dealings with the tribes of the Black Mountain having thus been brought up to the end of 1887, it now only remains to describe briefly the events which took place on the Agror border from the beginning of the year 1888 up to the despatch of the punitive expedition in October.

On the 9th January, a serious raid was committed by followers of Hashim Ali Khan, the chief of the Khan Khel Hassanzais, on Udigraon, a hamlet in the Agror valley. Two British subjects were killed and two kidnapped. The outrage was committed in retaliation for the arrest of Turabaz, the trusted servant of Hashim Ali Khan, a proclaimed offender, who was implicated in the attack on Kalakka in March 1883. In consequence of this raid the unconditional surrender of the two men kidnapped was demanded from Hashim Ali Khan; the tribe was reminded of its joint responsibility; and the Khan of Agror was told that he had laid himself open to suspicion.

To this message some of the Hassanzai *maliks* sent a defiant answer while Hashim Ali himself ignored it. Evidence was subsequently forthcoming which seemed to implicate the Khan of Agror, and his agent Fazl Ali Khan, in the raid on Udigraon.

The Lieutenant-Governor proposed that active measures should be taken against the Khan Khel Hassanzais and the Parari Saiads, but the Government of India did not consider there was sufficient justification for resort to a military expedition, the offences reported being rather the lawless acts of individuals, than the result of any general hostility on the part of the tribes.

As it was considered likely that further raids might be committed when the snows cleared away, application was made for an increase to the Ughi garrison, and in the month of March it was raised to a strength of 300 rifles. The defences of the Agror villages, and the arms of the villagers also received attention. A tower was built above the village of Sambalbut and garrisoned by 72 of the Khan of Agror's levies. The construction of a similar tower was contemplated high up the Barchar spur, and commenced, but its construction was stopped for military reasons.

On the 6th March, two British subjects were waylaid near the Jal pass when on their way to British territory from Chirmang and carried off to Bilandkot, but were released after a few days. This act was committed by the Parari Saiads and their Chagarzai tenants, and was regarded as an act of hostility on the part of these tribes.

During the month of March some 50 to 100 men from the Hindustani colony of Maidan, near Palosi, had joined Hashim Ali Khan, but in April they were reported to have returned to Maidan.

The charges against the Khan of Agror and his agent Fazl Ali Khan were in the meantime being investigated, and as a result the latter was arrested, and the former summoned to Abbottabad and then sent to Lahore.

As the Hassanzais as a tribe showed no intention of compelling Hashim Ali Khan to surrender the men carried off from our territory in the raid on Udigraon, orders were passed on the 10th April for the whole tribe to be blockaded, and it was directed that the Parari Saiads and their Chagarzai tenants should also be included. The Akazais had been under blockade since 1884. On the 1st June, the garrison of Ughi was reduced to 100 rifles.

On the 18th June, a serious affair occurred on the Agror frontier which resulted in the death of two British officers and four men of the 5th Gurkhas. Early on the morning of the 18th June, Major Battye, 5th Gurkhas, with 60 men of his regiment and 19 police, and accompanied by Captain Urmston, 6th Punjab Infantry, left Ughi fort and ascended the Barchar spur, to make himself acquainted with the features of the surrounding country, the water-supply, &c. Shortly before reaching the crest and while still within British territory, the party was fired on by some Gujar graziers who were tenants of the Akazais. The fire was not returned, and Major Battye pushed on towards Chittabat keeping within our own territory, but finding the enemy were becoming more numerous and their fire heavier, he decided to retreat, and accordingly the retirement of the party was ordered, covered by a small rear guard. A *havildar* in the rear guard having been wounded, the two British officers went back to his assistance with a stretcher, and while they were putting the wounded man into it, the enemy charged, and in the hand-to-hand fight which ensued Major Battye and Captain Urmston were killed. The main body in the meanwhile, unaware of what had occurred, continued their retirement down the mountain side. Subadar Kishenbir, who had been with the officers, though himself wounded, succeeded in escaping, and rejoining the main body at the village of Atir, led them back and recovered the bodies of the two officers. Four of the Gurkhas were left dead on the field and six rifles were lost. Of the enemy six were killed.

The Khan Khel Hassanzais and the Parari Saiads on hearing the firing turned out and joined in the attack on the detachment as they were retiring. The latter came to Mana-ka-Dana and fired at long ranges at our men retiring down the Chorkalan spur. Of the former Hashim Ali Khan with a party of some sixty men took up a position to cut off the retreat of the troops if they should come down the Barchar spur. He was here attacked by the Jaskot villagers and driven back with a loss of two killed, one being his own nephew. On our side one of the Jaskot men was killed. The Khan of Agror's levies who occupied a tower on the Sambalbut spur do not appear to have given any assistance.

After the affair of the 18th June above described, a large body of the Hassanzais, of nearly all sections, collected with Hashim Ali Khan on the crest of the Black Mountain, between the Sambalbut and Chajri spurs; the Akazais assembled in force above the Barchar ridge and at Chapra, and a contingent came from Parari. Plans were daily discussed as to how and where to attack Agror. On the 27th June, the aged Maulvi Abdulla with 120 Hindustanis from Maidan joined the Hassanzais on the crest, and it was then decided that no action should for the present be taken by the tribes, and on the 28th and 29th June

the gathering dispersed. On the 7th July, the garrison of Ughi was reduced to 100 rifles.

In July orders were given for the Hindustanis of Maidan to be included in the blockade of the Akazais, Hassanzais and Parari Saiads.

On the 31st July, Ali Gauhar Khan, the Khan of Agror, who had been removed from Lahore to Murree, was arrested at the latter place under Regulation III of 1818.

In the meantime the Punjab Government again urged very strongly the necessity of sending a military expedition to the Black Mountain. The Lieutenant-Governor pointed out that the occurrence of the 18th of June formed a strong *casus belli* against the Akazais, and expressed his opinion that the fact of two British officers having been killed and stripped in a savage and disgraceful manner constituted an incident which must be regarded, considering our position on the border, as gravely aggravating the importance and urgency of the case. Sir James Lyall was further strongly of opinion, that, until military action had proved to the Khan Khel Hassanzais and the Akazais that their country was not beyond our reach, and that we had the power to punish them, negotiations would not lead to any satisfactory settlement with the tribes. Under these circumstances the Government of India once more took into consideration the question of punitive measures against the Black Mountain tribes, and on the 29th

Punitive expedition recommended by Punjab Government.

August it was decided that an expedition had become absolutely necessary.

Punitive expedition sanctioned.

Orders were accordingly issued on the 7th September for the formation of a force to be styled the "Hazara Field Force" under the command of Brigadier-General J. W. McQueen, C.B., A.D.C. (with the temporary rank of Major-General), for the purpose of punishing the tribes of the Black Mountain for the repeated raids and acts of aggression committed by them. The force was to consist of—

Formation and composition of Hazara Field Force.

- 2 Mountain Batteries, British.
- 1 Mountain Battery, Native.*
- 1 Company of Sappers and Miners.
- 4 Battalions of British Infantry.
- 9 Battalions of Native Infantry, including 1 of Pioneers.

The troops were to be organized in two brigades under the command of Brigadiers-General G. N. Channer, V.C., and W. Galbraith respectively, and each brigade was to be subdivided into two columns. In addition to the above a field reserve consisting of one regiment of cavalry and two battalions of infantry was ordered to be formed. A detail of the staff is given in Appendix A.

Head-quarters and the 1st, 2nd and 3rd Columns were directed to concentrate at Ughi in the Agror valley by the 1st October and the 4th Column at Darband on the Indus by the same date. The Nowshera Brigade was at the same time ordered to be held in immediate readiness for field service. Infantry battalions were to take the field 600 strong. For baggage, staff officers were allowed half, and regimental officers one-third, of a mule. British and native non-commissioned officers and men were allowed 16 lbs. of baggage and followers 10 lbs. each, and no tents were to be taken. Seventy rounds of ammunition were to be carried in the pouch and 30 on mules with corps, and 100 at base; the 4th Column taking 60 rounds with it on mules instead of 30. Artillery reserve ammunition to be taken in full. With regard to supplies, 5 days' with 2 days' grain for all animals, were ordered to accompany the 1st, 2nd and 3rd Columns, and 7 days' to accompany the 4th Column. All equipment and supplies beyond Ughi and Darband to be carried on mules.

* To be made up to six guns.

The Maharaja of Kashmir having offered the services of his troops to the Government of India, his offer was accepted, and two battalions of Kashmir troops with two guns, under the command of General Indar Singh, were ordered to join the expeditionary force.

Kashmir Contingent.

Similarly the Khaibar Rifles having volunteered to take part in the operations, a detachment 300 strong, under Major Muhammad Aslam Khan, Sirdar Bahadur, C.I.E., were directed to proceed to Ughi to join General McQueen's force.

Khaibar Rifles.

By the 1st October the Hazara Field Force was concentrated at Ughi and Darband respectively, and the detailed composition of the force on that date is shown in Appendix B.

The standing orders given in Appendix C were published previous to the commencement of operations for the guidance of all officers of the force.

Instructions of Government for the conduct of the operations.

The instructions of the Government of India for the conduct of the operations

may be summarized as follows :

- I.—To coerce into submission the Akazais and the Khan Khel of the Hassanzais.
- II.—All other tribes and sections upon the Black Mountain not to be molested if they remained quiet.
- III.—The punishment to be inflicted upon any other tribes or sections which might join against us, to be for the consideration of the General commanding.
- IV.—The march to Thakot to be reserved for further orders.
- V.—When once the operations had begun the General commanding, while governing his operations as far as possible in accordance with the above, to have authority to act (in communication with the Chief Political Officer accompanying the force) according to his own judgment, in dealing with any development of the situation which might arise.

Subsequently, authority was received by Major-General McQueen to march on Thakot, and to visit the Allai country with the object of settling the outstanding demands against the Allaiwals.

A detail of the cases outstanding against the different tribes previous to the expedition are given in Appendix D.

Before the advance of the troops across the frontier, separate proclamations had been issued, in accordance with the instructions of the Punjab Government, to the Hassanzai tribe and to the Khan Khel section of that tribe, also to the Akazais, to the Parari Saiads with their Chagarzai tenants, and to the Tikariwals. These proclamations, which are given in Appendix E, specified the terms on which the Government were prepared to accept the submission of these tribes, who were allowed up to midday of the 2nd October to come to a decision; after which time, if they had not submitted at Ughi, active operations would be commenced.

Proclamations issued to the tribes.

The other tribes with whom we had no quarrel, *viz.*, the Deshis, Nandiharis, Mada Khel, and Chagarzais had received proclamations assuring them of our friendly attitude towards them. These are given in Appendix F.

On the 25th September Fazl Ali Khan, the agent of the Khan of Agror, who had been at the bottom of most of the mischief on this border, as already shown, effected his escape from the lock-up at Haripur with his brother Akbar Khan, and eluding all attempts to recapture him, found his way into independent territory.

On the 1st and 2nd October the troops were employed on the Agror side in pushing roads up the Mana-ka-Dana, Barchar, Sambalbut, and Chatta spurs.

Account of operations. First phase.

The 1st Column was encamped at Dilbori, the 2nd and 3rd Columns at Kalakka (the 24th Punjab Infantry and 2 guns of Derajat Mountain Battery, belonging to the latter, being detached to the foot of the Chatta spur), and the Reserve Column with the divisional head-quarters at Ughi. On the 2nd October the 4th Column moved from Darband and bivouacked in advance of the village of Chamb, distant 7 miles, the road having been previously made practicable for laden animals. During the afternoon Brigadier-General Galbraith and staff while reconnoitring the road in advance were fired upon from a ridge about 1,000 yards distant, north of Chamb, and as evening approached an attempt was made upon the water picquet, but was repulsed without casualty by a company of the 29th Punjab Infantry. On the Agror side also the troops covering the working parties had been fired on and it became evident that the tribes had no intention of accepting the terms offered by the Government.

The period of grace allowed having expired on the 2nd October and the tribes not having submitted, orders were issued for the advance of the whole force, but owing to the equipment of some of the corps not being complete it was found necessary to postpone the commencement of operations for 24 hours.

The final orders for the advance of the different columns were as follows :

No. 1 Column to move on the 4th to Mana-ka-Dana, and the following day to Chittabat, leaving a sufficient force at Mana-ka-Dana to protect their line of communications.

No. 2 Column to advance up the Barchar spur on the 4th, occupying Barchar; thence moving on 5th to the crest of the ridge; one regiment to be at once detached to the left to meet No. 3 Column.

No. 3 Column to advance up the Sambalbut spur, Sambalbut village to be occupied on the 4th and the advance to be continued to the crest on the 5th. The 24th Punjab Infantry and 2 guns Derajat Mountain Battery to move up the Chatta spur, meeting the remainder of No. 3 Column on the morning of the 5th at the junction of the Sambalbut and Chatta spurs. The Khaibar Rifles to advance up the Chajri spur between Nos. 1 and 2 Columns on the 5th.

The 4th Column was ordered to advance on the 4th to the neighbourhood of Kotkai on the Indus.

To commence with the operations of the 4th Column. On the morning of the 3rd, the enemy in large numbers attempted to re-occupy the ridge from which they had fired on our troops the previous day, but were anticipated by the 4th Punjab Infantry under Lieutenant-Colonel A. J. D. Hawes, and were driven back with a loss of two killed and four wounded, there being no casualties on our side. The road down to Bela on the Indus was on this day made practicable for baggage animals.

During the following night heavy rain fell, and on the morning of the 4th the whole column crossed the frontier and advanced to the Indus by the road which

had been made the previous day, the right of the advance being covered by three companies of the 4th Punjab Infantry, who occupied the ridge to the north, with orders to move over it and rejoin the column at the village of Shingri, leaving a strong picquet on the crest till the baggage and rear guard had passed. The

2 companies, Royal Irish Regiment.
Brigade head-quarters.
2 guns, 2-1 Scottish Division, Royal Artillery.
3 companies, 34th Pioneers.
Head-quarters, 4th Column.
Royal Irish Regiment.
2 guns, 2-1 Scottish Division, Royal Artillery.
Gatlings.
3 companies, 4th Punjab Infantry.
3 companies, 29th Punjab Infantry.
Regimental reserve ammunition.
1 company, 29th Punjab Infantry.
Field Hospital.
Telegraph.


troops in rear to form up on the open ground.

the column advanced at 6-30 A.M. in the order noted in the margin, followed by the whole of the baggage, including 7 days' supplies in regimental charge escorted by four companies of the 29th Punjab Infantry, two of which formed the rear guard. At 8 A.M. the head of the column reached the river bank and a halt was made to allow the

SKETCH MAP
OF
ENGAGEMENT
NEAR
KOTKAI,
4th October 1888.


Scale 4 Inches = 1 Mile.

100 50 0 100 200 300 400 500 600 700 800 900 1000 Yards





Rock where Col. Crookshank
was wounded on 5th Oct.

Spot where Capt. Beley was wounded.



REFERENCES.

1st Position of British troops ... Green
2nd " " " ... Red
Final advance on Kotkai ... Yellow
Enemy Blue
Sangars 
Direction of Ghazi rush 

I. B. February 1889.
Exd. J. A. A.

(Sd.) R. SOUTHEY, Lieut.,
3rd Beluch Regiment,
Intelligence Officer, 4th Column.

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At 9 A.M. the advance was continued to Shingri about a mile distant, which was found to be occupied by a few of the enemy. The advanced guard was accordingly halted and extended, two companies of the Royal Irish to the left of the village and two companies of the 34th Pioneers on a spur to the right, and the village was then carried with trifling opposition. A few of the enemy fired from the rocks and jungle above the village, but were driven off by a company of the 34th Pioneers gallantly led by Subadar-Major Chattar Singh, Bahadur, who was here mortally wounded.

At 10 A.M. the troops were again formed up in column of route and continued the advance across a sandy plain for a distance of about a mile, when large numbers of the enemy with many standards were discovered in position (see accompanying sketch map of engagement), their front line being across the open ground between the hamlet of Towara and the river, their main body holding a rocky ridge one mile long extending to the village of Kotkai; while numerous skirmishers lined the ravines and ridges of the hills on the right of the advance. At many commanding points strong *sangars* had been constructed and similar defences on the opposite bank of the Indus were held by sharpshooters supported by some useless guns of a reported calibre of 4 inches.

Having reconnoitred the enemy's position, Brigadier-General Galbraith directed Colonel A. C. W. Crookshank, C.B., commanding the column, to prepare for the attack by clearing his flanks. This was accordingly done. The 34th Pioneers searching the wide belt of jungle and boulders between our left and the river, while the 4th Punjab Infantry, led by Lieutenant-Colonel A. J. D. Hawes, scaled the difficult heights on our right and drove the enemy from every point of vantage in a style which commanded universal admiration. In this operation Captain O. C. Radford, 4th Punjab Infantry, was severely wounded, but continued to lead his men until ordered to desist.

The advance was necessarily very slow but at 1 P.M., Major H. R. L. Morgan, R.A., brought his guns into action against a wood held by the enemy some 600 yards to the front. The Royal Irish Regiment, under Major R. K. Brereton, had lined a low wall, one company on the left, the remainder on the right front of the battery and machine guns. Lieutenant F. J. S. Cleeve, R.A., was here dangerously wounded by a bullet which lodged in his neck.

At 1-30 the enemy's position having been well searched by artillery and machine gun fire, and the flanking parties being abreast of the line, the Royal Irish advanced without firing a shot, and as steadily as if on parade charged the enemy, Lieutenant W. Gloster particularly distinguishing himself by rushing to the front and capturing a standard.

At this moment a body of fanatical swordsmen, who had been concealed in a masked *nala* running diagonally towards our left front, made a desperate attempt to break our line. All were at once shot down by the Royal Irish and the Gatlings, except thirteen, who were followed and accounted for by two companies of the 29th Punjab Infantry and 34th Pioneers, in the jungle near the river.

Eighty-eight dead were subsequently counted at this spot, among whom forty-eight were identified as Hindustanis.

During the advance of the Royal Irish, Brigadier-General Galbraith and his staff were between them and the leading company of the Pioneers; the latter were firing in the direction of Kotkai, and while Major J. A. Barlow, Deputy Assistant Adjutant General, conveyed an order to the Royal Irish to fix bayonets, the Brigadier-General sent Captain C. H. H. Beley, D.S.O., Deputy Assistant Quarter Master General, to direct the Pioneers to enfilade the position attacked. In pointing out what was required this officer unfortunately rode a little in front of the party while they were emerging from a *nala*. He thus became the first object of the *Ghazi* rush, and his horse being cut down, he was overpowered

by numbers, and fell mortally wounded, fearlessly facing his opponents to the last.

The enemy in and around Kotkai now began to show signs of wavering, and the guns having advanced and taken up a new position opened fire on the rocky ridge in front of Kotkai, the village itself, and the *sangars* on both banks of the river; while the Gatlings swept the crest of the hills in front of the 4th Punjab Infantry, and as the defenders streamed downwards followed them with a galling fire. The enemy made little reply except from the right bank of the river whence the Hindustani guns and sharpshooters kept up a fairly constant but ineffectual fire until nightfall.

At 3-30 P.M., the enemy being in full flight towards Kunhar, Colonel Crookshank, C.B., with 4 companies 29th Punjab Infantry, supported by a wing of the Royal Irish Regiment and two guns, having climbed the ridge leading to Kotkai, occupied the village at 4-30 P.M. without opposition.

The village is perched on the top of a high conical peak of rocks on the left bank of the river and completely closes the valley at this point.

At 5 P.M. Colonel Crookshank returned to Towara, where the remaining troops and baggage bivouacked, brigade head-quarters being established at Kotkai.

The casualties on our side during the day were 5 killed and 10 wounded, the former including Captain C. H. H. Beley, D.S.O., Deputy Assistant Quarter Master General, and Subadar-Major Chattar Singh, Bahadur, 34th Pioneers, and the latter Captain O. C. Radford, 4th Punjab Infantry, and Lieutenant F. J. S. Cleeve, Royal Artillery. The Royal Irish had two men killed and three wounded. The enemy's loss was estimated at 200 killed and wounded. Brigadier-General Galbraith in his despatch describing this affair, brought to notice the names of the following officers:

Major H. R. L. Morgan, R.A.
Major J. A. Barlow, D. A. A. G.
Captain S. Grant, R.E.
Captain G. Lord Binning, Orderly Officer.
Captain E. Inglis, Assistant Political Officer.
Lieutenant M. S. Eyre, R.A.
Surgeon G. H. Barefoot.

Turning now to the operations of the Agror columns. On the morning of the 4th October, the 1st Column, troops as per margin,* under Colonel J. M. Sym, 5th Gurkhas, advanced at 6 A.M. from Dilbori in accordance with the plan of operations already detailed (see page 14), and reached

1st Column.
* Hazara Mountain Battery.
Half 3rd Company, Sappers and Miners.
2nd Battalion, Northumberland Fusiliers.
3rd Sikh Infantry.
1st Battalion, 5th Gurkhas.

Mana-ka-Dana at 10-30 A.M., having only met with slight opposition. There were no casualties on our side, but the enemy who appear to have been Parari Saiads, with their Chagarzai tenants, lost four killed. As soon as it was dark parties of the enemy commenced firing into the bivouac, and this continued in a desultory sort of way throughout the night and caused the following casualties, 1 man killed, and three wounded, Northumberland Fusiliers. At 11 P.M. an attack was made on that part of the bivouac where the commissariat establishments were located, and five followers were severely wounded with swords before the enemy were beaten off. Seventeen mules were also reported to have been stolen during the night.

The 2nd Column, troops as per margin,† under Colonel R. H. O'Grady Haly, accompanied by Brigadier-General Channer, V.C., and the head-quarters of the 1st Brigade, advanced up the Barchar spur from the camp at Kalakka on the morning of the 4th and reached the position assigned to them near the village of Barchar without meeting with any opposition.

2nd Column.
† 3-1 South Irish, R.A. (4 guns).
1st Battalion, Suffolk Regiment.
Wing, 34th Pioneers.
40th Bengal Infantry.
45th Sikhs.
2 Gatlings.

The 3rd Column, troops as per margin* (with the exception of the 2 guns Derajat Mountain Battery and the 24th Punjab Infantry), under Lieutenant-Colonel M. S. J. Sunderland, moved from the camp at Kalakka up the Sambalbut spur and bivouacked above the village of

3rd Column.
 * 3-1 South Irish, R.A. (2 guns).
 Derajat Mountain Battery (2 guns).
 Half 3rd Company, Sappers and Miners.
 2nd Battalion, Royal Sussex Regiment.
 14th Sikhs.
 24th Punjab Infantry.

that name. No opposition was met with during the advance. Major-General McQueen and the head-quarters accompanied this column.

The two guns Derajat Mountain Battery, and the 24th Punjab Infantry, under Major Young, moved up the Chatta spur on the same date, and there bivouacked.

The Khaibar Rifles remained at the foot of the Sambalbut spur ready to advance up the Chajri spur the next day, their baggage accompanying the 3rd Column.

On the evening of the 4th all the columns had thus reached their appointed positions. During the early part of the night heavy rain fell which caused considerable discomfort to the troops in bivouac.

On the 5th October, the 1st Column, leaving two companies of the Northumberland Fusiliers and two companies of the 3rd Sikhs to garrison Mana-ka-Dana, advanced at 6-30 A.M., and occupied the crest at Chittabat at 9-30 A.M., but the rear guard did not reach camp till 7 P.M., the path which ran along the northern side of the spur having to be made practicable for baggage animals. The working parties were exposed to fire from the enemy concealed among the trees, and one man of the Sappers and Miners and two men of the 3rd Sikhs were killed and one man Northumberland Fusiliers wounded. After dark the enemy continued to fire into the picquets, but without effect. Very little water was found on this day in the neighbourhood of Chittabat.

The 2nd Column continued its advance on the 5th up the Barchar spur and reached the crest at Bampur Gali without any casualties, having met with but slight opposition. The column bivouacked on the crest to the south of Bampur Gali. One man of the 40th Bengal Infantry was killed after dusk.

The 3rd Column moved at 6-30 A.M. on the same date from the village of Sambalbut and continued its advance up the spur, the Royal Sussex leading. The ascent was very steep and two battery mules rolled down the hill and were killed. At the junction of the Sambalbut and Chatta spurs, the column was joined by the 24th Punjab Infantry and the two guns Derajat Mountain Battery. At 8 A.M., the Sussex advanced on a steep bluff in front which was occupied by the enemy and, covered by the fire of the guns, took possession of it with a loss of two men wounded. The regiment then moved steadily forward along the crest of the spur driving a few of the enemy before them with a loss of one man wounded. The crest of the main range at Nimal was reached by the leading company of the Sussex, with the Major-General and staff, at 10-30 A.M. The last mile of the ascent was very steep. The sappers with working parties of the 24th Punjab Infantry and 14th Sikhs were employed in improving the road for the baggage, which did not reach the crest till late in the evening, some of it, indeed, not arriving till the next day. Besides the three men of the Sussex already mentioned, two men of the 14th Sikhs were wounded during the ascent. The column bivouacked for the night at Nimal. Here it was joined by the Khaibar Rifles, who had ascended by the Chajri spur, which proved to be steep and precipitous. At Nimal difficulty was at first experienced in finding water, but the following day a plentiful supply was discovered.

On the 6th October, owing to the difficulty of obtaining water and fodder for animals at Chittabat, all the baggage mules of the 1st Column were sent down to Dilbori at 7 A.M. under escort of six companies of the

5th Gurkhas and arrived there without casualty. Two guns of the Hazara Mountain Battery were sent back as a reinforcement to the four companies of infantry left at Mana-ka-Dana. At the same time a small column, strength

* Northumberland Fusiliers, 2 companies.
3rd Sikhs, 3 companies.

as per margin,* under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel Vincent, Northum-

berland Fusiliers, was despatched in the direction of Doda to search for water and forage. This movement was also calculated to indirectly secure the safety of the convoy. A plentiful supply of water was discovered in the *nala* to the north of the bivouac about 450 feet below it, and some forage was found near the village of Landa. To secure both it was necessary that the Doda hill should be cleared of the enemy who were annoying the parties at the water-supply. This was accordingly done by the two companies of the Northumberland Fusiliers supported by the 3rd Sikhs. A few shots were fired by the enemy from the crest of the hill, but they then fled, leaving the small village of Doda empty and the top of the hill undefended. The Northumberland Fusiliers advanced over the crest and down the other side towards Machai, leaving the 3rd Sikhs on the crest. Before the Fusiliers had returned to the crest about 30 or 40 of the enemy coming through the forest opened fire at 80 or 100 yards on the companies of the 3rd Sikhs who quickly advanced and drove them down the hill and the Fusiliers coming round took them in flank and killed several of their number. The advance was then continued down the spur to the east by the 3rd Sikhs supported by the Northumberland Fusiliers as far as the village of Landa, which was burned. The crops about the village were cut and sent back to camp and the water-supply was thoroughly opened up. Firing continued during the day and another man of the 3rd Sikhs was wounded. The total loss to the enemy was estimated at 30 killed and wounded. A quiet night was the result.

The 2nd Column on the 6th October moved along the crest to Nimal and occupied the bivouac vacated by the 3rd Column.

On the same date the 3rd Column advanced from Nimal towards Seri, the 14th Sikhs leading. The road lay along the crest for about $1\frac{1}{2}$ miles and then turned abruptly to the right down a steep spur. It had to be made by the sappers and working parties nearly the whole way, and consequently progress was extremely slow. The path lay through thickly wooded forest, in which the enemy carried on guerilla warfare, but did not appear in any large numbers.

The 14th Sikhs, with Major-General McQueen and the head-quarters staff, reached the hamlet of Kaima at midday, and as it was impossible for the baggage to get further than this point before darkness set in, it was decided to bivouac here for the night. Kaima consisted of two small plateaux with a few huts. The map of this part of the country (which had been compiled from native information) was found to be altogether incorrect, and the country in front to be far more difficult than had been supposed. From Kaima the smoke from the Seri villages could be seen ascending. These had been set on fire by the Khan Khel chief, Hashim Ali Khan, and his people, probably in the hope of thus avoiding a visit from our troops, and also to save himself from the disgrace of having his villages burnt by us. Our casualties during the day had been one non-commissioned officer and two men of the Royal Sussex wounded; one man killed, and one native officer and four men of the 14th Sikhs wounded.

On the following day, the 7th, having found that the nature of the country rendered it difficult to move a large body of transport animals till the roads had been improved, and the water-supply at Kaima being scanty and difficult of access, Major-General McQueen decided to return to the crest of the Black Mountain and accordingly the 3rd Column was withdrawn on the morning of the

half way between
Chittabul and
machai sar.

Kaima

7th. The enemy emboldened by our retirement followed up the rear guard of the column and we lost three men killed and one very severely wounded of the 14th Sikhs. Another man of this regiment was severely wounded in bivouac on the same day. The column bivouacked on the northern slopes of Akhund Baba, the 24th Punjab Infantry and Khaibar Rifles occupying a position on the top of the hill. The General and head-quarters were at Kain Gali in close proximity to the 2nd Column.

On the same day a reconnaissance consisting of five companies of the 24th Punjab Infantry under Major G. F. Young, and accompanied by Captain A. H. Mason, Deputy Assistant Quarter Master General for Intelligence, was pushed out along the main range towards Panji Gali. The reconnoitring party on withdrawing towards camp was boldly followed up by the Hassanzais and lost three killed and one severely wounded.

During the 7th, the 1st and 2nd Columns remained at Chittabat and Nimal respectively. The 40th Bengal Infantry, belonging to the latter, being sent down on this day to the camp at Kalakka.

To return now to the doings of the 4th Column on the Indus. From the 5th to the 7th October daily reconnaissances were made from Kotkai; but no forward movement was possible, the road from Towara to Kotkai being so bad that it was necessary to bring up supplies by hand. On the afternoon of the 5th a party under Colonel Crookshank, consisting of the 29th Punjab Infantry, and 2 guns, reconnoitred in the direction of Kunhar, but after advancing along the left bank of the river for $1\frac{1}{2}$ miles it was found impracticable to proceed further owing to the fire kept up by the enemy from the opposite bank of the river which it was impossible to silence, and the party accordingly returned to camp. During this reconnaissance Colonel Crookshank received a wound, from the effects of which he subsequently died. In consequence of Colonel Crookshank's wound, Colonel Beddy, 29th Punjab Infantry, as next senior officer, assumed command of the 4th Column.

On the 7th October, Brigadier-General Galbraith with the Royal Irish and 4th Punjab Infantry, visited the plateau of Tilli about 3,300 feet above Kotkai. Here the troops were met by some of the headmen of the Saiads of Tilli and on their petition the Brigadier-General promised to spare their villages on condition the column was not again molested from this direction. A fine view was obtained from here, Maidan, Palosi, Nawe Kili and Garhi were seen to be still occupied, but the inhabitants were apparently fast decamping and carrying off their cattle. The Brigadier-General with the Royal Irish returned from Tilli to the camp at Kotkai by the same way the column had come, while the 4th Punjab Infantry moved down to Kunari, a stiff descent of about 1,200 feet, and there bivouacked for the night. On this day the boats of the Nawab of Amb arrived at Kotkai.

On the 8th October, Lieutenant-Colonel Hawes from Kunari occupied Kunhar at 9 A.M., and reconnoitred towards the Shal nala returning to Kotkai at night, the path being impracticable for getting up supplies. The following day the whole of the troops in camp at Kotkai were employed in improving the road to Kunhar and in bringing forage in boats from Marer on the right bank of the Indus. A few shots were exchanged during the day with the enemy on the opposite side of the river, but the enemy's breast-works on the right bank were now almost deserted. Two companies of the 29th Punjab Infantry under Major A. J. F. Reid occupied Kunhar this day.

On the 10th a force, as per margin,* under Lieutenant-Colonel Hawes, 4th Punjab Infantry, crossed the river in boats by the Kotkai ferry and made a reconnaissance

* 2-1 Scottish, R.A., 2 guns.

Royal Irish Regiment, 4 companies.

4th Punjab Infantry, 5 companies.

towards the village of Garhi, which it occupied without opposition. Brigadier-General Galbraith himself then crossed the river and after reconnoitring the ground towards Palosi and Maidan he gave the order for the force to retire and recross by the ferry to Kotkai. The enemy followed up the retirement but Captain Gray, 4th Punjab Infantry, commanding the rear guard, covered the withdrawal with skill and repelled a determined attack of the enemy at dusk. Two men of the 4th Punjab Infantry were wounded in this affair. Captain Gray brought to notice the excellent conduct of Subadar Umar and also of Sepoy Mehtab Singh, 4th Punjab Infantry, on this occasion. The latter shot three of the enemy's swordsmen at close quarters.* Work had been carried on during the day on the road to Kunhar, and two companies of the Royal Irish and two more companies of the 29th moved to Kunhar with light baggage in the evening.

On the 11th, the column, with brigade head-quarters moved to Kunhar. Owing to the difficulty of the road it was past nightfall before the whole force was concentrated at the new bivouac. On this day four boats were passed up the rapids above Kotkai, provoking in transit some fire from the opposite bank which was checked by picked marksmen. A few shots were fired into the bivouac at Kunhar after dark, but these were not replied to and, except killing a mule, they caused no loss.

On this day communication by signalling was opened with the Ughi force at Panji Gali on the crest of the Black Mountain.

The 12th was spent in improving the road from Kotkai and carrying it on one mile beyond Kunhar to Gazikot where there was a good camping-ground and a ferry. In the afternoon the column, with the exception of the Royal Irish, and brigade head-quarters, which remained at Kunhar, moved to Gazikot. Large numbers of the enemy, with many standards, appeared near the village of Mangan on the right bank of the river two miles above Maidan, and subsequently paraded on the hills to the south of Palosi.

Saiad Alam one of the two prisoners in the hands of Hashim Ali Khan, having escaped, came in to camp this day.

On the 13th October, at daylight, Brigadier-General Galbraith with the force

Destruction of the Hindustani settlement of Maidan.

2-1 Scottish, R.A.,	3 guns.
Royal Irish Regiment,	469 rifles.
4th Punjab Infantry,	361 "
29th "	437 "
34th Pioneers	194 "
Two Gatlings.	

noted in the margin, crossed the river with the object of destroying the Hindustani fort and settlement of Maidan. By 8 A.M. the whole force had crossed the river, and having been formed up advanced across

the plain on which Maidan is situated, which is about 1,200 yards broad and two miles long. To the south rise high but not very steep hills with several Hassanzai villages scattered about on the plain below. These villages were found to be empty, and at 9-30 A.M., the force after passing through Palosi halted at about 300 yards from Maidan which was also found to be deserted.

Maidan was surrounded by high mud walls with bastions. Having blown up the principal bastions the Hindustani settlement was burned to the ground. Soon after 11 A.M. the retirement commenced and the force returned to their bivouac on the left bank of the river without casualty. A gathering on the hills above Maidan watched the proceedings of the column but with the exception of a few stray shots no opposition was offered by the enemy.

On this date (13th) Brigadier-General Channer and staff with an escort of some 300 rifles arrived at Kunhar from Betband, and thus joined hands with the 4th Column.

* Sepoy Mehtab Singh subsequently received the Order of Merit (3rd class) for his conduct on this occasion.

The destruction of Maidan may be considered to have brought to a close the active operations of the 4th Column, no hostile shot having, subsequent to that, been fired at the troops operating on the river side.

The fact that the Hindustanis offered no resistance to the destruction of their stronghold shows that the losses they sustained in the affair near Kotkai on the 4th October had completely broken their spirits. Maulvi Abdulla and his following subsequent to their defeat had dispersed among the Chagarzais and neighbouring tribes wherever they could find a refuge.

This was the fifth occasion during the past 40 years on which the Hindustanis had come into collision with the British Government, and each time they had suffered severely and been forced to shift their settlement. They had on each occasion brought those tribes with whom they had taken up their residence into trouble. It is, therefore, highly probable that they will experience some difficulty in founding a new settlement in the immediate vicinity of our border.

Operations of the Agror columns from the 8th to the 20th October.

The operations of the Agror columns which have been described up to the 7th

October will now be continued.

On the 8th October, the position of the 1st Column at Chittabat remained unchanged. During the night a party of the enemy, amongst whom it was believed was a deserter from the 29th Punjab Infantry, crept up close to one of the picquets of the 3rd Sikhs, and fired three shots in quick succession, killing a *subadar* and wounding two sepoys of that regiment, and then made off under cover of the darkness. In consequence of this, orders were issued that all fires and lights in bivouac should be extinguished at sunset and that trees should be fired at a distance of from 50 to 100 yards in front of the bivouac, so as to prevent the unseen approach of parties of the enemy.

The 2nd Column remained at Nimal on the 8th October. In the 3rd Column one man of the 24th Punjab Infantry was killed while on picquet in the early morning. A reconnaissance consisting of the troops noted in the margin was made on this day towards Panji Gali. This was successfully carried out: the Khaibaris did good service and destroyed a number of hamlets down the Abu spur towards Ril. Two men of the Khaibar Rifles were wounded, but the enemy made no attempt to follow up the troops when retiring.

Derajat Mountain Battery	...	2 guns.
Detachment Sappers and Miners.	...	
Royal Sussex Regiment	...	300 rifles.
Khaibar Rifles	...	200 "

morning. A reconnaissance consisting of the troops noted in the margin was made on this day towards Panji Gali. This was

On the 9th a column composed of troops from the 2nd and 3rd Columns under Brigadier-General Channer proceeded to Seri without meeting with any opposition. The villages of Selle and Karwai belonging to the Khan Khel Hassanzais were destroyed *en route*. The Seri villages had already been burnt by the Khan Khels themselves, but a tower and a fort which had been left standing were blown up by the engineers. The large villages of Bar and Kuz Kand on the opposite side of the Shal *nala*, belonging to the Akazais were shelled from the Seri plateau with good effect, the inhabitants clearing out with their goods and cattle. The force returned to camp at 5-30 P.M.

During this day a commissariat driver was shot and cut up on the road from Nimal down to Sambalbut within British territory. The men concerned were seen descending the Chatra spur in Tanawali territory and the Nawab of Amb was accordingly warned to see to the safety of the country within his limits and directed to post a picquet on the Chatra spur.

An *ultimatum* was sent to the Hassanzais on this date increasing their fine, on account of the active hostility shewn, to Rs. 7,500, the other terms being as originally fixed, and giving them till midday of the 15th to submit.

An *ultimatum* was also sent to Hashim Ali Khan, that if he did not deliver up himself and his three relatives, Shekh Ali Muhammad, Turabaz and Sikandar

Khan, unconditionally, the remaining Khan Khel villages would be destroyed, the only assurance given was the sparing of their lives.

The Akazais were at the same time informed that it was proposed on the following day to destroy certain of their villages, but another opportunity was given them to submit and save themselves and their families from further ruin and misery. (See Appendix G.)

In accordance with this notification to the Akazai tribe a force of 500 men and 2 guns from the 1st Column proceeded from Chittabat on the morning of the 10th to Biran, an Akazai village concerned in the attack on Major Battye's party.

The force moved to Doda and then followed the crest of a long spur running in a south-westerly direction at the lower extremity of which Biran was situated about 1,500 feet below the bivouac at Chittabat. A few shots were fired by the enemy as they retired from the village, but without effect, two of their own number, however, being killed. The village was then burnt, as well as a quantity of property of the villagers found concealed under rocks below the village; and the force returned to camp.

On the same day the officer commanding at Mana-ka-Dana attacked and destroyed the Parari villages of Kanganbaffa and Siala, the inhabitants of which had been concerned in attacks on convoys. Several of the enemy were reported killed.

From the 2nd Column a force, as per margin, under Colonel O'Grady Haly, accompanied by Colonel Gatacre, Chief of the Staff, and Major Egerton, Assistant Adjutant General, moved down to destroy Bar and Kuz Kand, the two principal villages of the Akazais. The troops left

3-1 South Irish, Royal Artillery	...	2 guns.
Suffolk Regiment	...	200 rifles.
34th Pioneers	...	100 "
45th Sikhs	...	300 "
Khaibar Rifles	...	100 "

camp at 7 A.M. and reached Seri at 11 A.M. From Seri a small column of 420 rifles under Colonel Waterfield, 45th Sikhs, descended into the Shal *nala*, and after an arduous ascent reached the Kand villages which they partially burnt, and returned to bivouac at Seri. Some opposition was met with during the attack and the enemy's loss was estimated at 13 killed and wounded. There were no casualties on our side. Working parties from the 3rd Column were employed this day in making the road along the crest as far as Panji Gali.

On the 11th, Lieutenant-Colonel A. G. Hammond, V.C., 3rd Sikhs, with 200 men of the 5th Gurkhas, and 150 of the 3rd Sikhs, moved down the Saidra spur from Chittabat and after a descent of 2,600 feet reached the Parari village of Saidra, which he destroyed and then returned to camp. No opposition was offered, the village having been vacated before the arrival of the troops.

From the detached force of the 2nd Column at Seri a reconnaissance was pushed out in the direction of Sabe and returned to Seri in the evening.

Major-General McQueen this day proceeded with an escort to Panji Gali and opened communication by signalling with Brigadier-General Galbraith at Kunhar as already mentioned.

The Nawab of Amb on the same date arrived in camp on the crest of the Black Mountain and remained there till the 19th, when owing to ill-health, he was given permission to return to Shergarh.

On the 12th, Colonel O'Grady Haly returned to the 2nd Column at Nimal and Brigadier-General Channer took command of the detached force from this column at Seri, which was then moved to Karun about a quarter of a mile to the south-west of Seri. The village of Marwata or Merabad was on this day destroyed.

At noon Brigadier-General Channer, with the escort as per margin, proceeded to the village of Betband with the object of making a reconnaissance towards, and effecting a junction if possible with, the 4th Column on the river. The men carried great coats, one day's cooked rations and 50 rounds of ammunition. The force bivouacked for the night at Betband and the following morning at 7 A.M., the march was continued *via* Kungar, Makranai and Ranzur to Kunhar which was reached at noon and communication with the 4th Column was thus effected as already mentioned.

On this date (13th) Major-General McQueen visited Chittabat and inspected the 1st Column.

On return to camp it was found that a messenger from the Akazai *jirga* had arrived bringing a letter urging of course their innocence, stating that they had no connection with the "barbarous Gujars," whose country was unknown to them; and expressing their readiness to come in on assurance of safety. A reply was sent that the whole Akazai *jirga* must come in, otherwise their punishment would continue.

From the 2nd Column a detachment under Colonel H. G. Waterfield, 45th Sikhs, proceeded from Karun and burnt the villages of Maira and Sabe and returned to Karun the same evening.

Lieutenant-Colonel M. S. J. Sunderland with a detachment from the 3rd Column proceeded along the Abu spur and destroyed the remaining hamlets there and also burnt the village of Ril.

The 2nd Sikhs, under Colonel H. M. Pratt, from the Reserve Column, moved on the same day from Kalakka to join the 4th Column *via* the Unar valley and Darband. Colonel Pratt received orders to detach 200 men under Colonel F. E. Hastings to visit Tilli *via* Pabal Gali and then rejoin the regiment. On the departure of the 2nd Sikhs, Lieutenant-Colonel A. Murray, Seaforth Highlanders, assumed command of the Reserve Column.

On the 14th, parties from the 1st and 3rd Columns were employed in improving the road between Chittabat and Nimal. Brigadier-General Channer left Kunhar this day on his return to Karun and reached the hamlet of Ranzur where he bivouacked for the night. In accordance with the orders received Colonel Hastings with 200 men of the 2nd Sikhs visited the Tilli plateau. The road from Pabal Gali to Tilli was found to be very steep. The hamlets were almost deserted and the *Saiad* headmen were not present, nor was a Pathan *nazar* presented as had been ordered by the Chief Political Officer. The last was explained by the villagers to be owing to the fact that the notice to do so had not been received before the arrival of the troops. Colonel Hastings returned to Pabal Gali the same evening and proceeded the following day to rejoin the headquarters of his regiment.

On the 15th Brigadier-General Channer returned to Karun, the party was fired at on the return journey, but had no casualties. Two of the enemy were killed.

A mixed detachment of 500 men from the 3rd Column under Major G. F. Young proceeded to Panji Gali, taking three days' rations with them, to improve the road along the crest to Pabal Gali.

Colonel Gatacre, Deputy Adjutant and Quarter Master General, and Major Elles, Assistant Quarter Master General, with an escort of 50 men of the Khaibar Rifles, left Kain Gali at 6 A.M. for Kunhar *via* Karun and arrived there at noon. The former started back again at 2 P.M., reaching the bivouac at Kain Gali at 11 P.M. The descent was about 7,500 feet. Major Elles returned on the 17th *via* Makranai, Ril and Panji Gali. This route he reported to be shorter but steeper

than that by Kungar and Karun. Neither of these routes was practicable for baggage animals.

On the 16th October a force, consisting of two companies of the Northumberland Fusiliers and two companies of the 5th Gurkhas, was sent from the 1st Column to complete the destruction of the village of Saidra which was only partially burnt on the 11th. There was some slight opposition. The enemy's loss was reported to be seven while our casualties were three wounded. The pole of the *dandi* lost with Major Battye's party was found in the village.

The Kashmir Contingent arrived at the Chattar plain in Konsh on this date.

On the evening of the 16th a *jirga* claiming to be a representative one of the nine sections of the Hassanzais came into Brigadier-General Galbraith and was sent on by him at once to divisional head-quarters where they arrived at midday on the 17th. The *jirga*, however, was found to be not sufficiently representative and was accordingly dismissed with a warning that until a full *jirga* came in the punishment of the tribe must continue.

The Tilli Saiads brought in the *nazir* which they had failed to present to Colonel Hastings, on his visit to Tilli, to Major Young at Panji Gali on the evening of the 17th, and this was distributed to the troops.

On the 18th, Brigadier-General Channer from Karun crossed the Shal *nala* and completed the destruction of Bar and Kuz Kand and blew up the tower of the latter. Six prisoners, including a leading *malik* were captured.

This punishment had the desired effect and on the return of the troops to Karun, they were followed by the Akazai *jirga* who were sent on to head-quarters the following day.

On the 19th a force of 200 men from the 2nd Column proceeded from Nimal and burnt the Akazai village of Dare, the men of which were concerned in the attack on Major Battye's party. No opposition was offered. On the same day a man named Muhammad Amin, who had been found in hiding in Tanawali territory was arrested by the Nawab of Amb and sent into camp. He was identified as a servant of Hashim Ali Khan and had been engaged in the Udigraon raid (see page 10). He was ordered to be made over to the police and sent in chains to the jail at Abbottabad. The Akazai *jirga*, having meanwhile arrived

Submission of the Akazais.

at head-quarters on the 19th, accepted unconditionally all the terms that had been imposed and were given seven days to collect the fine, leaving five selected hostages in our hands. Orders were accordingly issued that no more Akazai villages were to be destroyed during the period of grace thus allowed.

On the 20th a force consisting of the troops as per margin, under Colonel J. M. Sym, accompanied by Colonel W. F. Gatacre, Deputy Adjutant and Quarter Master General, and Captain A. H. Mason, Deputy Assistant Quarter Master

General for Intelligence, started from Chittabat at 4-30 A.M., to visit the Machai peak, which was reached without opposition at 6-20 A.M. There were no signs of armed men, nor were there any traces of *sangars* or breastworks, as had been reported. The Chagarzai country in fact appeared perfectly quiet and no inhabitants were visible. The survey from this point having been completed and a panoramic view of the whole country obtained (see sketch), the force left the Machai peak at 10-30 and returned to camp without having fired a shot.

The Machai peak was visited by the force under Major-General Wilde in 1868, and is the point at which the boundaries of the Chagarzais, Akazais and Parari Saiads all meet.

Its height is 9,825 feet and the view from the summit is very fine. "The panorama begins with the Gandghar and Mahaban mountains, the Indus running

visited on 21 June 43 by Col. Malcolm B. with 2 NCOs and 6 AC. 0510
left 0510 0830 reached Machai 500 1230 via Belian - Bampur Gali
left 1230 1415 reached Chagarzai 2015 via Nimal - Samthal Gali

between and Attock seen in the distance between the opening. On the north of the Mahaban nestles the old Hindustani settlement of Malka, destroyed in 1863. The Ambela pass, with the lofty peak of Guru, is prominent to the west. The "Crag" picquet and the "Conical" hill, which played so important a part in the Ambela expedition, stand out clear; through the gorge of the pass is dimly seen the cantonment of Hoti Mardan. From the pass the pretty valley of Chamla slopes towards the Indus. Next Mount Ilam shews boldly against the sky, the great barrier between Buner and Swat. Away on the far horizon glistens the snow-capped Hindu Kush, then the valley of Upper Swat, and the lofty snow peaks of the Laram range beyond the mountains of Kohistan, Kaghan and Kashmir, and lastly the well known Pir Panjal range. In the foreground are the valleys of Pakli and Konsh, and the *sanitaria* of Murree and Thandiani."

With the visit to the Machai peak the first phase of the operations may be said to have been completed. These operations had been directed against the Akazais and Hassanzais. The former had made their submission as already related, and had been allowed seven days to collect the fine imposed upon them; and the latter, although no further news had been received of their movements since the dismissal of their *jirga* on the 17th, had entirely ceased all opposition, and their principal villages on the river were at the mercy of the 4th Column.

Before describing the second phase of the operations, it will be well to complete the account of the operations of the 4th Column which have been brought up to the 13th October, and to shew the measures taken by Brigadier-General Galbraith to put pressure upon the Hassanzais to accept in full the terms imposed upon them.

On the 14th October the 2nd Sikhs arrived at Darband from Kalakka camp, and the following morning Colonel Pratt assumed command of the 4th Column.

On the 16th a force of 900 men, under Colonel Pratt, crossed the river, and brought away all the forage and grain they could from the villages of Palosi, Garhi and Nawe Kili. Some *maliks* from the two last named villages came to meet the force and begged mercy, but Palosi sent no representatives, and consequently orders were given for half the village to be destroyed before the force returned to camp. This was done and all the troops were back on the left bank by 1 P.M. bringing with them 300 maunds of forage and a small quantity of grain.

This raid had the effect of bringing in the Hassanzai *jirga* who were sent on to divisional head-quarters by Brigadier-General Galbraith the same evening, but the *jirga* not being considered a sufficiently representative one, was, as already stated, dismissed by Major-General McQueen on the 17th with the warning that the punishment of the tribe would continue until a full *jirga* came in and made complete submission.

On the 17th, Brigadier-General Galbraith made a reconnaissance as far as Diliari. Crossing the river at daybreak with an escort of 200 men of the Seaforth Highlanders, and 200 men, 4th Punjab Infantry, he pushed across the Palosi plain to a point opposite Bakrai, to which spot three boats had previously been sent up. There the troops recrossed, ascended to Bakrai and then climbed the hill to Diliari (an Akazai village). The ascent was fairly easy, but at Diliari there was great scarcity of water and the troops suffered a good deal from thirst. From Diliari a fine view was obtained up the Indus valley as far as Kotlai. On the right bank is a plain dotted with villages and fairly well cultivated. On the left bank the hills close in on the river and are very steep. After a halt of one and a half hours at Diliari, the party returned to Kunhar, the Brigadier-General

and staff going down the river through the rapids by boat. On the 18th, foraging parties were sent over the river to Garhi, Palosi and Nawe Kili and brought away some 1,200 maunds of forage. One house which had been left standing in Maidan was also destroyed.

Working parties were employed on the road from Kunhar to the mouth of the Shal *nala* along the left bank of the river, and the 34th Pioneers were at work improving the river route to Darband.

On the 19th, Bakrai was occupied by Colonel Pratt with the Royal Irish, the 29th Punjab Infantry, and two guns, 2-1 Scottish, Royal Artillery. Four days' supplies were taken by the force.

On the following morning Colonel Pratt moved up the Shal *nala* and followed the path by Lashora to Led which was then occupied by the troops. This village, belonging to the Akazais, lies in an amphitheatre on the right bank of the *nala* and is of some size; water is obtainable from the Shal stream some 150 feet below the village. Information having been received from Major-General McQueen of the submission of the Akazais, Colonel Pratt was directed not to destroy any more villages or crops belonging to that tribe.

On this date (20th), the river route from Darband to Kunhar was opened, and the telegraph office and troops were consequently withdrawn from Chamb. The distribution of troops of the River Column on the evening of the 20th October is shewn in Appendix H.

The subsequent operations of the River Column were uneventful. Reconnaissances were made on both banks of the river, and Brigadier-General Galbraith visited the 3rd Column at Tilli, Pabal Gali, Panji Gali and Karun. Colonel Pratt's force occupied Led from the 20th to the 23rd. On the 22nd a reconnaissance was made to Darbanrai, and from a point above it a good view up the Indus valley was obtained. On the 23rd, the force moved back to Bakrai and on the 25th was withdrawn to Palosi, from whence a reconnaissance was made on the following day as far as Mangan the last Hassanzai village on the right bank of the Indus. No opposition was met with, the disposition of the inhabitants being, on the contrary, friendly. There was a fair mule track the whole way, and from Mangan a fine view was obtained of the bend of the Indus and the villages of Bimbal, Biliiani and Maira on the left bank. Road making was carried on by the troops, assisted later on by 400 Hazara coolies who arrived at Tilli on the 1st November. A good baggage road was made from Karun *via* Kungar, Ril and Tilli to Chamhari and Darband with practicable lateral communications to Kunhar, one difficult from Ril by Makranai, the other fairly easy from Pabal Gali *via* Tilli and Kunari. In the meanwhile in order to bring pressure on the Hassanzais, a hamlet on the right bank of the river opposite Kunhar was destroyed on the 24th, Garhi and Bakrai were burnt on the 25th, and on the 29th October

Submission of the Hassanzais.

Kotkai was also destroyed. The following day the tribe gave up the remaining prisoner in the hands of Hashim Ali Khan (the other had, as already mentioned, made his escape and come into our camp on the 12th October), and paid up the enhanced fine of Rs. 7,500 in full, and orders were accordingly given to cease destroying the villages and cutting the crops of the Hassanzais. The *jirga* of the tribe was then forwarded to Ughi and arrived at that place on the 2nd November. A copy of the final agreement made with the Hassanzai *jirga* at Ughi on the 9th November is given in Appendix I. The agreement signed by the Akazais will also be found in the same Appendix. Their tribe on the 26th paid up the fine of Rs. 4,000 demanded from them, and sent in a full *jirga* to the Commissioner of the Peshawar Division at Ughi as directed.

Thus were brought to a satisfactory conclusion the operations against the Result of operations against the Hassanzais and Akazais. The punishment inflicted on these tribes had been very severe. The Chief Political Officer considered that their loss in burnt villages, fodder, corn, and honey amounted to Rs. 50,000 at the least. It will take them two years to rebuild their villages and settle down again as they were before the expedition; their casualties must also have been heavy. They never believed that British troops could move about their difficult glens and mountains, nor did they realize that we would stay in their country, or expect to be freely requisitioned for supplies till they submitted to the terms, and lastly they had to pay the fines themselves in cattle before they could re-occupy their country which they felt was completely in our power. The deterrent effect of the punishment will, it is anticipated, prevent the occurrence of outrages such as necessitated its infliction; offences must necessarily be committed, they can no more be prevented among these tribes than in our own country, but a repetition of tribal outrages against the Government and wanton violation of our border, and slaughter and kidnapping of British subjects are not likely again to happen.

To turn now to the second phase of the operations. This may be considered to have commenced on the 21st October, the object being to coerce into submission the Parari Saiads and the Tikariwals. The scope of the operations was subsequently extended, and on the 23rd October permission was received for a movement on Thakot. On the 31st, the despatch of a force into the Allai country was sanctioned.

On the evening of the 20th October, the troops of the Hazara Field Force were distributed as follows:
Distribution of Hazara Field Force on the evening of the 20th October.

Divisional head-quarters.	} Mana-ka-Dana.
Head-quarters 1st Brigade.	
No. 1 Column, reinforced by a wing 34th Pioneers. Mana-ka-Dana.	
No. 2 Column, occupied Chittabat having relieved No. 1 Column.	
No. 3 Column, distributed between Karun, Akhund Baba, Nimal and Tilli.	
No. 4 Column. Led, Kunhar, Kotkai, Shingri and Darband.	

• A fifth column composed of—

4 guns, 3rd South Irish Division, Royal Artillery,
 Head-quarters and wing of the Seaforth Highlanders,
 Wing, 40th Bengal Infantry,
 Khaibar Rifles,
 Two Gatlings,

under the command of Colonel A. Murray, Seaforth Highlanders, was moved up to Dilbori with a view to taking part with No. 1 Column in the ensuing operations. A detailed distribution of the troops on the evening of the 20th October is given in Appendix H.

On the 21st, the 1st Column moved on Trand.

Brigadier-General Channer with the 3rd Sikhs left Mana-ka-Dana at 4-15 A.M., with the object of surprising Bilandkot. The village, however, was found unoccupied, but a few shots were fired from the neighbouring *nala*, and the enemy had one man killed and one wounded. On our side there were no casualties.

The Major-General and staff with the remainder of the 1st Column marched from Mana-ka-Dana at 6-30, and the whole column bivouacked beyond Chirmang

about half a mile due south of Trand. The baggage followed by the same route, a fair mule track, and reached the bivouac at noon. The distance was about four miles from Mana-ka-Dana.

The 5th Column moved forward from Dilbori and were employed during the day, assisted by 300 coolies, who had been brought up for road making, in improving the track from the Jal pass towards Trand, and bivouacked at night about a mile short of Chirmang. This village had been found deserted by the troops in the morning, and in the evening Rahim Khan, the headman of the village, and chief of the Malkal section of the Tikariwals, came into camp and agreed to pay up the share of the fine demanded from him. The other two leading men of Tikari, *viz.*, Ghafar Khan of Trand and Nawab Khan of Darian, had made their submission before their country was entered and thus the whole fine of Rs. 1,000, imposed on the Tikariwals had been realized.

As, however, Rahim Khan had delayed his payment and attendance, he was further punished by having forage for the force for one day taken from his lands, and wood taken from his village.

On the 22nd, Major-General McQueen reconnoitred the Parari glens from the Bilandkot spur to arrange his plan for attacking the villages of the Parari Saiads. Brigadier-General Channer at the same time made a reconnaissance in the direction of Maidan over the Shabora spur, and strong working parties were ordered out to improve the road.

In the evening a *jirga* of the Parariwals came in, but the principal men were not present. An *ultimatum* was accordingly sent to the tribe warning them that if these men did not attend by the following evening their villages would be destroyed.

On the 23rd, Major-General McQueen reconnoitred to the top of the Shabora spur, and the 5th Column moved forward two miles in advance of the 1st Column to Sufian at the foot of this spur. The Parari headmen not having come in, the incomplete *jirga* was dismissed and orders were issued for punitive measures to be carried out on the following day. In the evening heavy rain fell which caused some discomfort to the troops in the open.

Sanction having been received on the 23rd for the force to visit Thakot, letters were sent to the Thakoti *maliks* giving them notice of this and stating that our intentions were friendly, as long as no opposition was offered, and inviting them to send in their *jirga*.

At 8 A.M. on the morning of the 24th, a force moved into the Parari Saiad country. On the left two guns, 3-1
Destruction of Parari villages of Garhi and Kopra. South Irish, with an escort of 100 infantry took up a position on the spur under Bilandkot to cover the advance. In the centre a column composed of 300 men of the 3rd Sikhs, under Lieutenant-Colonel A. G. Hammond, V.C., advanced up the Machai spur and destroyed the village of Kopra with slight opposition. A small force of 200 men and two guns from Chittabat co-operated down the spur from the direction of the Machai peak. On the right the main column consisting of 800 rifles and 2 guns, under Colonel J. M. Sym, moved up the principal Parari glen, past the villages of Machai and Parari direct on Garhi. The 5th Gurkhas furnished flanking parties on the right of the column. The Khaibar Rifles, supported by the Seaforth Highlanders, destroyed Garhi after some opposition from the enemy. The latter were reported to have lost 15 men killed and wounded. On our side there were no casualties, with the exception of a private of the Northumberland Fusiliers, who was killed by a snake bite.* The whole force returned to camp by 5 P.M. The villages of Kopra and Garhi were selected for destruction as being the furthest

*Harind at
 24th.*

and most inaccessible of the Parari villages, in order to show the tribe we had the power to move anywhere we liked in their country. The village of Garhi, moreover, belonged to Mian Saiad, the most influential headman of the Parari Saiads.

The body of a camp follower was found this day to the north of Mana-kadana with the head nearly cut off. He must have strayed off the road or come along late.

On the 25th, the 5th Column with Brigadier-General Channer and staff moved to Maidan in the Nandihar valley, about five miles distant from the camp at Chirmang.

On the same date His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief visited the camp of Major-General McQueen from Ughi, and after inspecting the troops at Chirmang rode over to Maidan to visit the 5th Column, and returned to the bivouac at Chirmang for the night. On the following day Sir Frederick Roberts and staff rode along the crest of the Black Mountain inspecting the troops at Mana-kadana, Chittabat, Nimal; returning to Ughi by the Sambalbut spur and leaving the same afternoon for the 4th Column *via* Abbottabad and Darband. The Adjutant-General, the Military Secretary and one of the aides-de-camp moved across to Kunhar by Karun, rejoining His Excellency at the former place, on the 28th, on which date the Commander-in-Chief inspected the troops of the River Column.

On the 26th Brigadier-General Channer with the 5th Column moved to Dabrai, 6 miles, making the road as they advanced: and the 1st Column, with Major-General McQueen and the head-quarters staff, moved to Maidan, leaving a detachment at Chirmang. Messengers arrived from Arsala Khan of Allai to beg that the force might not visit his country, and a reply was sent stating the terms on which the Government was prepared to accept the submission of the tribe. This reply is given in Appendix J.

On the 27th Brigadier-General Channer advanced from Dabrai *via* Paimal and Serai to Chanjal—about $2\frac{1}{2}$ miles. The road just beyond Dabrai and also between Serai and Chanjal was very steep and difficult, and strong working parties assisted by the corps of coolies were employed during the day in improving the road. The Major-General moved from Maidan to Serai with a portion of the 1st Column, leaving detachments to hold Maidan and Dabrai.

Serai is a small plateau of terraced fields on the spur above Chanjal and below Paimal. It is also known as Shamsher Ghat, or Shamsher's stone, and tradition has it that Sultan Shamsher had steps cut on the face of the boulder to the top, and there he sank two bosses for pegs to which to tie his horse. The steps are broad niches cut out of the boulder. It is said that before the advent of the Pathans and Swatis, the whole of this mountainous country was held by Turks, who had small forts on all the prominent points of the spurs and ranges around. The country here and beyond and all around is most precipitously mountainous, steep, broken and rugged, with very little forest.

Up to this point there had been no opposition, but the attitude of the Thakotis was uncertain and their *jirga* had not come in. It was, moreover, reported that their women and cattle had been sent away, and that their lower villages were deserted, and on the 27th a message was received by the Chief Political Officer asking for twenty days to collect their *jirga*.

Under these circumstances the General Officer Commanding decided to make an immediate advance so as not to allow time for any combinations of the tribes to oppose the advance. Orders were accordingly issued for a lightly equipped force to proceed to Thakot the following day.

At 6-30 A.M. on the 28th the force, as per margin, under Brigadier-General

Visit to Thakot.

3-1 South Irish, Royal Artillery	...	2 guns.
Seaforth Highlanders	...	259 rifles.
3rd Sikhs	...	250 "
34th Pioneers	...	209 "
Khaibar Rifles	...	200 "
2 Gatlings.		

G. N. Channer, V.C., having left all baggage behind under a guard, and taking only one blanket per man, great coats and one day's rations, marched to Thakot.

The path led down from Chanjal to the Nandihar (or Thakot) stream, which it crossed (the depth of water being about $1\frac{1}{2}$ feet) and then ascended the opposite spur to Karg, from which hamlet there was a descent of about 1,500 feet to Thakot. The path was steep and bad, and had to be improved as the troops advanced. The force reached Karg at 8-30 A.M., and Brigadier-General Channer leaving here a small detachment with two guns, descended by a steep path to Thakot, which was reached without opposition soon after noon. A few mules accompanied the force and one of these fell over the precipice between Karg and Thakot and was killed. The Nandihar stream had to be re-crossed near its mouth just before reaching Thakot. The village proved to be an insignificant place, and from its position (in the bottom of a teacup as it were), of no importance from a military point of view. The distance from Chanjal was somewhat over five miles. Thakot had not been visited by the force in 1868 owing chiefly to the difficulties of the country, and this had given an exaggerated importance to the place, and had caused the inhabitants to regard it as inaccessible to our troops. After marching the whole force through the village, with the bagpipes playing "You're owre lang in coming, lads," Brigadier-General Channer returned to the village of Lora on the left bank of the Nandihar stream. During the afternoon the inhabitants of the village of Daut across the Indus opened fire upon our troops and shots were also fired from the heights to the south, in rear of the bivouac, but a few rounds from the Gatling guns cleared the ground in front, and the Khaibar Rifles and 34th Pioneers, gaining possession of the heights to the south soon cleared those parts of the enemy. One man of the Seaforth Highlanders, and one of the Khaibar Rifles were wounded, the enemy being reported to have lost 12 killed and 4 wounded.

The night passed quietly, with the exception of a few shots fired from the heights to the south into the picquets held by the Khaibar Rifles.

Owing to the opposition which had been offered, which was traced to the

Destruction of the village of Lora.

headmen of Lora, that village with its tower was destroyed before the force retired on the morning of the 29th. Thakot itself was spared as its inhabitants had not opposed our troops. The two guns, 3-1 South Irish, which had been brought down from Karg, shelled the village of Daut on the other side of the river, whence the enemy had opened fire the previous afternoon. The tower of this village was destroyed by the guns and the village itself set on fire.

The force then returned to Seri which was reached without any casualties on our side at 5 P.M.

Colonel Gatacre with a detachment of the 3rd Sikhs and Khaibar Rifles withdrew from Thakot by a path running along the right bank of the Nandihar stream, and some opposition was experienced by this party during their return near the small village of Mirazai, the inhabitants of which rolled down stones on the troops. Colonel Gatacre accordingly ordered the few houses composing the hamlet to be destroyed.

The Major-General subsequently recorded his appreciation of the manner in which Brigadier-General Channer had conducted the operations connected with the march to Thakot.

It should have been mentioned that on the 28th the Chittabat peak had been evacuated and the head-quarters of the 2nd Column had been transferred to Chirmang, in order to bring pressure to bear on the Parari Saiads by taking grain, forage and wood from their country.

On the 29th the sword belonging to Major Battye, which had been carried off when he was killed, was recovered and handed over to the General Officer Commanding.

On the 30th October the whole force returned to Maidan. The retirement was conducted without opposition. The Sahibzada of Paimal, a holy man of great local influence, who in 1868 had come into our camp, and had then and again now shown himself to be friendly to the Government, had been warned the previous evening, that if any shots were fired during the retirement unhappy results would follow.

The period of grace given to Arsala Khan of Allai to come in and make his submission having expired on the 30th and there being no signs of any intention on his part to accept the terms offered by the Government, orders were issued by Major-General McQueen for an advance towards the Allai country on the following day.

Accordingly, on the morning of the 31st, a force composed of the troops of

Advance into Allai.		
1st Column.		
Hazara Mountain Battery, 2 guns.		
Half No. 3 Company, Sappers and Miners.		
Northumberland Fusiliers	540 rifles.
* Detachment, Suffolk Regiment	50 "
* Detachment, Royal Sussex	50 "
* Detachment, 24th Punjab Infantry	50 "
Wing, 34th Pioneers	246 "
5th Gurkhas	479 "
5th Column.		
3-1 South Irish Division, R.A., 4 guns.		
Wing, Seaforth Highlanders	248 rifles.
† 3rd Sikh Infantry	445 "
Khaibar Rifles	253 "

the 1st and 5th Columns, as per margin, under Colonels J. M. Sym and A. Murray respectively, marched towards the Ghorapher pass. The other troops of these columns remaining at Maidan.

Brigadier-General Channer accompanied the 1st Column, and the divisional head-quarters followed with the 5th Column. The Major-General inspected the detachment of the Kashmir troops, some 800 strong at Batgraon, under command of General Indar Singh. These troops had just moved into Nandihar from the Chatter plain. After inspecting the Kashmir contingent Major-General McQueen joined the force at Mazrai‡ where it bivouacked for the night. The road from Maidan to Mazrai, about 8 miles, had been made practicable for camels.

At Mazrai, which was over 7,000 feet, little water was obtainable, and there was no forage to be had except from a distance. During the day Brigadier-General Channer reconnoitred towards the Ghorapher pass which was found to be occupied by the enemy.

On the 1st November the advance on the Ghorapher pass leading into

Capture of the Chaila ridge.

Allai was continued by the 1st Column, supported by the 5th Column. The path led along a very gentle spur, rising some 1,000 feet in about $3\frac{1}{2}$ miles, to the foot of a precipitous ascent, very much broken with rocks and cliffs. The enemy held the crest and the forest on the left of the advance and the position they occupied was naturally so strong that if it had been held by a determined opponent it would have been almost impregnable.

The crest of the Chaila mountain is here protected by immense masses of precipitous granite slates, behind which, as the force ascended the spur, clusters of men could be seen. The first shots were fired in the thick forest at the foot

* 50 Marksmen from each of these regiments had been sent up to join the force in Nandihar.

† This regiment had been transferred from the 1st to the 5th Column.

‡ This was the name given officially to this camping-ground. The more correct name and the one by which it is known to the people of the country is Bhagsir.

of the ascent at 10-30 A.M., and as the advance progressed with the Northumberland Fusiliers and Khaibar Rifles leading, the firing was for a short time very brisk, while the guns at a range of 2,000 yards covered the advance and fired up, throwing shells amongst the granite crags and into the thick forest. The enemy at first beat drums, played their pipes and yelled in defiance, but these sounds soon died away as our men pushed up the steep slopes and scrambled over the crags. Before noon the position was taken, the Fusiliers and Khaibaris reaching the crest almost simultaneously. Our loss was only one man killed and one wounded of the Northumberland Fusiliers. A few bodies of the enemy were found on the crest, and also some blankets, food bags, &c., shewing they had gone off in a hurry.

On the crest being gained Brigadier-General Channer pushed on with the Northumberland Fusiliers, 5th Gurkhas and Khaibar Rifles to Kage Oba,* $2\frac{1}{2}$ miles further on, the total distance from Mazrai being $6\frac{1}{2}$ miles. Here a plentiful supply of water was found and a good camping-ground, and there was a track fit for mules leading to it along the crest. The path, however, up to the crest for the last 500 feet was found to be quite impracticable for mules, and the Pioneers and the Sappers and Miners, assisted by the coolie corps, which had been brought up from the rear, were employed all day in trying to improve the path, but it was not till dusk that it was reported practicable. Only a very few mules could be got up this day, and the night was one of great discomfort for the troops, who were for the most part without food or blankets. There was, moreover, a hard frost during the night, the elevation being over 9,000 feet. Fortunately wood was plentiful, the bivouac being in partially cleared forest. The baggage was massed, as far as possible, at the foot of the ascent to the Chaila crest, with the guns; and the Seaforth Highlanders with the 3rd Sikhs held the line of the crest with picquets. Five hundred men of the Kashmir troops moved from Batgraon to Mazrai to take the place of the force that had advanced and to keep open the communications. A letter was received this day from Arsala Khan, the point of which was contained in the last sentence "kindly wait and stay a little." His object was evidently to gain time, being aware that owing to the lateness of the season operations might at any time be stopped by snow.

At day-light on the 2nd, the baggage commenced to ascend the steep part of the road from the bivouac below. In places the road was very difficult, especially where rocks prevented the free passage of the baggage mules. Here many loads were unshipped and others had to be unloaded. The last mules did not reach the crest till dark and the rear guard did not arrive in camp till 9 P.M. The difficulty of the road may be imagined from the fact that the baggage took 12 hours to make the ascent—about 1 mile in length. During this ascent some 14 mules were killed by falling over the precipice. The enemy fired occasional shots from the forest and Lieutenant C. F. S. Ewart, Seaforth Highlanders, received a bullet wound in the forehead, one follower belonging to the telegraph department was killed and a sepoy of the 5th Gurkhas was wounded.

Two hundred rifles of the Kashmir Contingent were brought up this day from Mazrai to the foot of the Ghorapher pass, and were employed in improving the road.

During the morning Brigadier-General Channer made a reconnaissance in the direction of Pokal, the head-quarters of Arsala Khan, returning to camp about 3 P.M. The reconnoitring party met with some slight opposition and three of the enemy were killed and two wounded. A report was brought in that

* This means the winding stream.

Arsala Khan had fled across the Indus, but that his eldest son Ghazi Khan was holding out with a following. Orders were accordingly issued for a small force under Brigadier-General Channer to proceed to Pokal the following day and after destroying it to return to the bivouac on the crest. During the day slight snow was falling.

The night was somewhat disturbed by shots being fired into the camp.

At 8 A.M. on the 3rd, the force, as per margin, proceeded to Pokal, which

Destruction of Pokal.			
3-1 South Irish Division, R.A.	...	2	guns.
Northumberland Fusiliers	...	160	rifles.
Suffolk Regiment	...	40	"
Royal Sussex Regiment	...	40	"
Seaforth Highlanders...	...	160	"
24th Punjab Infantry	50	"
5th Gurkhas	...	200	"
Khaibar Rifles	...	150	"

was reached at 11 A.M. The path ran with a gentle gradient first through a fir forest and then through dense jungle of oak and holly, till within two miles of Pokal from whence the descent was steep and over open ground. The enemy offered some opposition to the advance, and suffered considerable loss. On reaching the village the detachments of Suffolk and Royal Sussex Regiments (all picked marksmen) fired volleys on the retreating bodies of the enemy at long ranges with great effect. The village of Pokal was entirely destroyed, with the exception of the mosque, and the tower was blown up and the force at 1 P.M. commenced to retire, detachments of the Seaforth Highlanders and Khaibar Rifles forming the rear guard. The enemy followed up most persistently, to the number of about 300 to within a mile of the camp, but were driven off by the steady fire of the troops. One company of the Northumberland Fusiliers occupied a knoll, and waiting for the enemy to collect in groups, soon had an opportunity of pouring in a volley, which effectually drove them back leaving a good number killed. Our loss during the day had been one killed and one wounded, 5th Gurkhas, and three wounded, Khaibar Rifles. Brigadier-General Channer in his despatch estimated the enemy's loss at from 80 to 100 killed, and he considered that the small number of casualties on our side was largely due to the admirable manner in which the troops skirmished during the advance and performed rear guard duties during the retirement. The troops all returned to camp before dark after a very heavy day's work. The distance to Pokal was seven miles and the descent 4,300 feet. The Allai valley was found to be open and highly cultivated and dotted about with numerous large villages.

Late on the evening of the 3rd, an Allai *jirga* representing five out of the eight sections and comprising the faction opposed to Arsala Khan arrived in camp.

On this day a report was received that the Parari Saiad *jirga* had come in to Chirmang and they were ordered to be sent to Maidan to meet Major-General McQueen on his return. Since the destruction of their villages of Garhi and Kopra on the 24th October, pressure had been put upon this tribe by taking from their villages wood, forage and corn for the use of the troops, and this pressure had now induced the tribe to submit to the terms imposed upon them.

On the 4th November the whole force withdrew from the Allai country to Mazrai, the Major-General and divisional staff returning to Maidan. The withdrawal was satisfactorily conducted, the baggage which was sent ahead was clear of the crest of the Chaila ridge by noon, and the rear guard reached camp at Mazrai at 4 P.M. Some shots were fired from the thick forest on the right flank during the retirement, and one sepoy of the 24th Punjab Infantry was killed. The enemy's loss was reported to have been 12 killed.

The Pioneers, Sappers and Miners, and Hazara Mountain Battery moved back this day to Maidan, and the Kashmir troops returned to Batgraon.

The *jirga* of the Parari Saiads who had come into Maidan were interviewed on the evening of the 4th by the Chief Political Officer, and they paid up Rs. 479 and gave five headmen as hostages. They were then dismissed, being allowed two days to collect the remainder of the fine of Rs. 1,500 imposed upon them. This they subsequently brought in to the Major-General at Chirmang on the 7th November.

Submission of the Parari Saiads.

On the 5th Brigadier-General Channer's force was withdrawn from Mazrai to Maidan. The enemy made no attempt to follow up or molest the force during the retirement. The Allai *jirga* which had accompanied the force to Maidan was this day dismissed as it was considered impossible to deal with any but a full *jirga* or one bringing in the whole fine, which the present deputation was not prepared to do, and it was explained to them that all Allai would be held responsible for the hostile action of any of its inhabitants, and that the whole fine must be paid within a reasonable time in cash or cattle, otherwise a blockade would be reimposed. It was also pointed out to them that we had punished Arsala Khan and had seen the Allai country, and could at any future time visit it again if we wished; and if such a visit were forced on us, our stay would be a longer one and we should, moreover, live on the country.

Return of the force to British territory.

On the 6th a report was received that a medical officer escorted by three men of the Seaforth Highlanders had been fired on near Rahimkot in Tanawali territory. The Nawab of Amb was called on at once to investigate the matter, and arrest the offenders. This he did with great promptness and on the 7th he was able to report that four men concerned in the outrage had been arrested and handed over to the police. The prisoners were sent to Ughi to be tried judicially under the Punjab Frontier Regulations.

From Maidan the troops were gradually withdrawn to British territory, and on the 10th the whole force (with the exception of the 4th Column on the river side, and the Kashmir Contingent, which had been withdrawn on the 8th to the Chattar plain), was concentrated in the Agror valley. The head-quarters of the 2nd Column had been withdrawn from Chirmang to Kalakka on the 5th November, and the 3rd Column from Karun had reached the same camp on the 4th, being rejoined there by the 14th Sikhs and the half company of Sappers and Miners from Tilli on the 7th November. Orders

Agror columns broken up on the 11th November.

were received on the 11th for the force in the Agror valley to be broken up, and the necessary instructions were at once issued.

On the same date orders were received by Brigadier-General Galbraith to withdraw his force to British territory. This was carried out without a shot being fired and on the 13th the whole of the 4th Column was concentrated at Darband where they were inspected by Major-General McQueen (who had come round from Ughi by the Unar river route), on the 14th, and the same day the troops began to disperse to their several destinations.

4th Column broken up on the 14th November.

Before the field force was broken up Major-General McQueen issued the following farewell order:

Farewell order issued by Major-General McQueen.

"On the approaching departure of the troops composing the Hazara Field Force for India, Major-General McQueen congratulates the officers, non-commissioned officers and men, of all corps and departments belonging to the force under his command, on the thorough manner in which they have carried out the work entrusted to them by His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief under the orders of the Government of India.

"Briefly the results of the expedition may be summarized as under :

"The Hassanzai, Akazai, Parari Saiads, and Tikariwals have tendered their submission in full, in accordance with the terms dictated to them by the British Government. The Machai peak and Thakot, as well as Pokal, the principal village of the Allaiwals, have been visited by the force, and the construction of roads along the Indus valley to the Chagarzai border and to Thakot from the Agror valley, gives the power of rapid movement to troops in the future, which will go far towards maintaining the security of our frontier and our friendly relations with cis-Indus tribes.

"The enemy against whom the force has had to contend have hitherto considered themselves secure from attack, owing to the mountainous and supposed inaccessible nature of their country ; but the Hazara Field Force of 1888 has proved to these tribes that their highest and most difficult passes, hitherto untrodden by the foot of European, can be traversed by any well-organized force.

"Much hard work has been entailed both in marching and road-making, and the exposure at high elevations by Nos. 1, 2 and 3 Columns, and the heat experienced by the River Column during a period of six weeks, without tents, has been most trying.

"It is a source of great pleasure to the Major-General to be able to report, for the information of General Sir F. Roberts, V.C., G.C.B., the cheerful manner in which all duties have been carried out, the exemplary conduct of the force, and the soldierly spirit which has animated all ranks on every occasion.

"The almost total absence of sickness amongst the troops, from first to last, showed that the fine condition of the men left nothing to be desired by any commander.

"In bidding the force farewell, Major-General McQueen heartily thanks all ranks for the very efficient help they have invariably rendered him during the operations which have now come to a close."

A list of the villages occupied and destroyed during the expedition will be found in Appendix K.

The terms of the agreements made with the Hassanzais and the Akazais have been already mentioned (see Appendix I). The agreement signed by the Tikariwals after their submission is given in Appendix L.

With reference to the conduct of the tribes of the Black Mountain with whom we had no quarrel, it is only necessary to make a few remarks. The attitude of the Deshiwals was friendly throughout. The same may be said of the people of Nandihar, and at the termination of the expedition their *jirga* entered into a similar agreement as that signed by the *maliks* of Tikari. (See Appendix L.)

The conduct of the Chagarzais was not so satisfactory, a few men of that tribe were engaged in the attack on the rear guard of the force returning from Palosi on the 10th October, and a son of the *malik* of Judba was said to have been killed. It was, however, considered by Major-General McQueen that this could not be held to have been done with the consent of the tribe, who did not actually oppose us on any other occasion. Had they been hostile they could have sent a force on different occasions to assist the Akazais, oppose our visit to Machai, assist the Parariwals, or aid the Thakotis.

The General Officer Commanding therefore held that as a tribe they had kept aloof, and that in face of the proclamation which had been sent to them before the commencement of the operations (see Appendix F), we should not be justified in proceeding against them. With this view the Government of India agreed, and beyond summoning their *jirga*, no further action with regard to them was considered advisable previous to the withdrawal of the force. A deputation of the tribe subsequently came into Abbottabad on the 3rd January 1889, in obedience to the summons, but they were forbidden to mention the case of the outlaw Abdulla Khan (see page 5), who was the cause of the trouble on

the Agror frontier in 1884, and whose case had delayed the *jirga* coming in during the active operations.*

The immediate results of the expedition may here be briefly recapitulated.

Results of expedition.

The Khan Khel section of the Hassanzais had been severely punished and had had all their principal villages burnt. The Hindustani settlement had been completely destroyed. The Parari Saiads after bringing heavy punishment on themselves had eventually submitted and fulfilled the Government terms, and Arsala Khan of Allai had been punished by having his village and tower destroyed. The fines imposed—

Rs. 4,000 on the Akazais,
Rs. 7,500 on the Hassanzais,
Rs. 1,500 on the Parariwals,
Rs. 1,000 on the Tikariwals,

were all duly paid, for the most part in cattle. Of the two British subjects carried off into captivity by Hashim Ali Khan, one escaped and the other was released. The Akazais and Hassanzais have given hostages for future good behaviour. Both of these clans have admitted their responsibility for the conduct of the *Khan* of the Khan Khels and chief of all three sections of the Isazais, that is of the tribe to which they both belong. They have undertaken that in future the troops or servants of the British Government shall not be molested if they march on the Black Mountain anywhere within British territory or along the crest of the mountain on the boundary between British and independent territory. The Akazais have promised for the future—an important point—to lay no claim to the Shatut lands, and to make no buildings, and to graze no cattle to the east of the watershed of the Black Mountain on the Agror side. They have explicitly declared that they have no right of any kind in that part of the country and will not interfere in any way with it. The Hassanzais have undertaken not to injure any roads which have been made within their territory during the operations. A similar promise has been made by the Tikariwal and the Nandihar *jirgas*. Although there were no outstanding cases against the Nandiharis, whose country like that of the Tikariwals is easily open to attack, both of these tribes have agreed to be responsible for any offences committed in British territory by themselves or by residents in their country, and to refuse passage to others intending to commit such offences.

Major-General McQueen in his despatch on the operations of the Hazara Field Force, noted in addition to the above political results of the campaign, the opening up of the Thakot and Allai countries (hitherto unvisited) by the formation of good mule roads into the heart of these tracts; the completion of a thoroughly good camel road from Ughi to Dabrai and a mule track from Darband to Kunhar; the detailed survey of 177 square miles of unknown country, besides the collection of much valuable geographical information.

The measures of a permanent kind which should be taken to facilitate intercourse with the Black Mountain tribes, to give us a better and quicker command of the approaches to that region, were postponed for subsequent consideration and settlement.

The thorough nature and effect of the punishment on the Hassanzais and Akazais may be judged by, latterly, the constant movement of detachments about the country without opposition, and the retirement of the troops without a shot being fired.

* Since the deputation returned to their own country, Abdulla Khan of Dilbori has come into British territory and thrown himself on the mercy of the Government, and thus a constant source of trouble on this border has been removed.

The instance of a British soldier of the Royal Irish Regiment wandering about unhurt from the 6th to the 11th November, trans-Indus, though unable to conceal himself, is significant of the subdued condition of the people.

The attitude of the Hassanzai *jirga* at Ughi was very humble, and Colonel Ommanney stated that he could not help feeling sorry, seeing a *malik* put his hands together when speaking for the *jirga*. So different from their former manner.

The Deputy Commissioner of Peshawar noticed the fear inspired along the border by our operations, and no doubt the account of the ease with which we worked over this rugged country, our improved weapons, telegraphic and heliographic appliances and other arrangements has spread far and wide, and will have a good effect among all the tribes, from the Indus to the snows of the Hindu Kush, with whom we now, or may in future, have relations.

The visit to Thakot, though unfortunately resulting in a collision with a party of the tribe, no doubt had a good effect in showing our power and our discrimination and care in respecting the property of those who accepted the assurance of our friendly intentions, and we have ascertained the character of the country, and probably a better route into Allai than the one we adopted.

As to Allai the punishment inflicted on Arsala Khan in his public disgrace by the burning and blowing up of his village and tower, must have the best effect, not only on Allai and the adjacent Swati countries of Thakot, Nandihar and Tikari, but on our own Swati subjects, the leaders of whom raised him into importance and led to his assumption of the title of "Amir" for their own purposes. It is singular that a chain of connection by marriage connects Arsala Khan of Allai with the leading men of Thakot, Nandihar, Tikari, our own Swatis, Parari Saiads, the Khan of Agror, and lastly Hashim Ali Khan, Khan Khel; his pride and the evil advice of leading men among the Swatis within and without the border prevented his personal submission, all that was required of him; and his humiliation and through him of his party was necessary; as to the fine it is believed that its realization can be enforced in time by a strict blockade, as the flocks of Allai pasture in British territory in the winter, and the people depend on intercourse with it for many necessities of life.

One peculiar feature of this expedition was the large number of British subjects who went from Hazara, and, it is said, from the Rawal Pindi and Jhelum districts even, and fought against us, many being killed and wounded; the greater number no doubt went from the first named district and especially from the Tanawali tract. The fact of the Hindustanis being engaged against us may be accepted as the cause that led to the rising of this wave of religious feeling, no other reason has been put forward, and no other can be suggested as at all likely to have induced men thus to sacrifice their lives. Such being the motive, it may be assumed that the continued residence of the Hindustanis at Maidan, so close to our border, had led to the spread of their doctrines in the neighbourhood. The expedition, therefore, on this ground was not a day too soon to show the people on this border our power and capability and determination to punish when necessary. Maulvi Abdulla personally knew the folly of resistance, and is said to have advised submission, but his position on sufferance, and payment for his location, forced his followers to come to the front, otherwise they would have fared badly at the hands of the Hassanzais on whose lands they resided, and of the other allied tribes; as it is, instead of the whole of the colony fighting to the death as they are supposed to do, less than 100 out of 600 or 700 met our troops, and this fact must discredit them far and wide and diminish their income from India, and consequently their numbers. It is not yet known where

Religious fanaticism amongst British subjects.

they will again settle down, possibly in Thakot or Allai; the latter they would prefer, being nearer our border, for the more easy obtaining of recruits and money.

In this connection it is fair to record that the Nawab of Amb arrested and made over to the police certain of his subjects who had fought against us, and was from first to last ready in performing any service demanded of him, such as supply of boats, levies, escorts, &c.; he has many enemies who do and will strive to make the most of the fact of his Tanawali subjects, some of them his relations, being engaged against us, but there is no reason for doubting his loyalty.

The association of the Khaibar Afridi volunteers under their efficient commander Major Muhammad Aslam Khan, C.I.E., will have a good effect; they have

acquitted themselves bravely as soldiers,* have established a feeling of comradeship with British regiments by mutual assistance rendered to each other, and lastly they have seen and realized that in a country more mountainous and difficult than their own, the British soldier can work with ease, and that our improved guns can command distant spurs over intervening glens, and that no difficulties can stop our operations.

A detail of the casualties sustained by our troops during the operations is given in Appendix N. It is difficult to give the enemy's losses with any pretensions to accuracy, owing to the wooded nature of the country, and the practice of our opponents of carrying off their killed and wounded.

These were estimated by Major-General McQueen as follows:

Losses on the 4th October in action of Kotkai	200
Losses during the first phase of operations up to 20th October	100
Losses at Thakot and Allai	100
TOTAL			400

These numbers, however, must be taken as a *minimum*, the losses at Thakot and Allai being obviously under-estimated, as Brigadier-General Channer reported that the enemy lost 80 to 100 men killed in the attack on Pokal alone. The losses, moreover, of the Parari Saiads (about 20) subsequent to the 20th October are not taken into account.

The character of the country which had been the theatre of operations is similar to that of the adjacent Hazara district. The higher mountains from an elevation of 7,000 feet upwards are generally well wooded, the principal forest trees being the *chir* (*pinus longifolia*), the *biar* (*pinus excelsa*), and the *tosh* and *rai*, common in all the higher forests of the north-western Himalayas. These are abundant on the crest of the Black Mountain and on the Allai hills between about 8,000 and 10,000 feet above sea level. Below the forests, where the slopes of the hills become more gentle all the available ground is terraced, and at the time of the expedition was covered with abundant crops of *makkai*. Where water is plentiful, rice is cultivated, and on the more level parts of the country wheat is grown; *makkai* and rice, however, are evidently the principal products.

On the western side of the Black Mountain the ground as a rule falls steeply for some 2,000 feet from the crest, then follows a zone of, comparatively speaking, gentle slopes, all under cultivation; as for instance at Kand, Karun and Tili; below this from an altitude of about 4,000 or 5,000 feet the hills fall

* A copy of G. G. O. No. 123 of 1889 is given in Appendix M, granting the Order of Merit to five members of this corps for conspicuous gallantry.

precipitously to the Indus valley, which has a general slope of about 10 feet per mile from Thakot at an altitude of nearly 1,800 feet to Darband at 1,400 feet above the sea. West of the Indus from the Barandu river, which enters the Indus just north of the Mahaban range, up to Maidan, the hills rise gently and are under cultivation to their crests; above Maidan the Duma range runs precipitously down to the river, but north of it again, at Kamach and as far as could be seen for some distance beyond Judba the higher hills fall back and there is a considerable margin of cultivation on both banks of the river. The actual valley varies in width from a few hundred yards to nearly two miles, the narrowest being perhaps between Kotkai and Kunhar, and the broadest at Palosi; the river itself runs in a well defined channel, at the time of the expedition 40 or 50 feet below its banks, which are generally rocky or covered with enormous boulders.

Major-General McQueen in his despatch drew particular attention to these natural difficulties of the country, and said—

Natural difficulties of the country.

"I feel it due to the troops under my command to bring prominently to the notice of His Excellency the hard work performed by them during the past six weeks. The rugged and inaccessible nature of the country, enhanced by the scarcity of water, has hitherto led the tribes of the Black Mountain to believe that our organized troops could not penetrate their territory, and that they were secure from attack.

"The difficulty of the country has in my opinion, not been over-estimated, and it has only been by pushing forward roads, wherever columns had to advance, that I have been enabled to overrun the whole of the Hassanzai and Akazai country, and to move to Thakot and into Allai.

"The operations have been carried out at elevations varying from 1,200 to 10,000 feet, and as an instance of the hard marching experienced, I would mention the movement to Pokal, when the troops descended 4,300 feet returning the same evening.

"I believe that in no previous expedition has the soldier, British or Native, undergone harder work in marching, road making, and convoy duty, and it would have been impossible for any troops to have carried out these duties in a more cheerful and soldierly spirit."

In the despatch attention was drawn to the small amount of sickness there had been in the force, which was attributed to the men having been specially selected for their physical fitness, the favorable conditions of the climate, and the good quality of the rations issued.

Health of troops.

The General Officer Commanding also brought to notice the work done by the engineer officers attached to the force, especially in road making, 222 miles of road having been made practicable for pack transport during the expedition.

Engineering operations.

The work of the telegraph department and the success of the signalling and survey operations were also specially noticed. The first had often to be carried on under most adverse circumstances but on only two occasions was telegraphic communication with the head-quarters of the force interrupted. Twenty-three offices were opened during the expedition and 11,531 messages passed through the Ughi office alone.

Telegraph.

The signalling in conjunction with the telegraph, kept the General Officer Commanding in touch with the whole of the force throughout the operations. The survey party, in addition to the 177 square miles surveyed in detail, succeeded in sketching more or less carefully from the opposite slopes 246 square miles on the west bank of the Indus. The course of this river was definitely fixed to some

Signalling.

Survey.

distance north of Thakot, with the exception of some 13 miles between Judba and the mouth of the Chakesar river. Its course here, however, was approximately determined within narrow limits.

The valuable work done by the Commissariat, Medical and Veterinary Departments were brought prominently to notice and the good services rendered by the chaplains with the force, the provost marshal and his assistants and by the post office were also acknowledged.

Major-General McQueen mentioned the service of the Khaibar Rifles, the Kashmir Contingent, and the local levies, and after making some suggestions for the future security of the Agror frontier concludes by noticing the services of individual officers. The following are the words of the despatch:

"I would bring to the notice of His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief the excellent service done throughout the expedition by the Khaibar Rifles under Major Muhammad Aslam Khan; their rapidity of movement over the hills and familiarity with the tactics pursued by the enemy have proved them to be troops of the very best material for the class of fighting in which we have recently been engaged.

"Their discipline has been excellent, and no instance of misconduct has been brought to my notice, or to that of the column commanders, under whose immediate orders they have served.

"It is a source of gratification to me that His Excellency has seen fit to recommend, and that Government has been pleased to sanction, the free gift to the corps of the Snider rifles, which they have shown themselves so competent to use in the service of the State.

"I have also much pleasure in bringing forward the good services rendered by the troops of His Highness the Maharaja of Kashmir, under the command of General Indar Singh.

"These troops throughout evinced a most soldierly spirit, and carried out all duties, including road-making and foraging, with energy and cheerfulness.

"I would also wish to express my satisfaction at the good service rendered to Government by the Nawab of Amb, and the promptitude with which he responded to all calls made upon him.

"The boats manned by his boatmen rendered invaluable aid to the movements of the River Column, and contributed largely to the success of the operations on that side, while order was maintained along the Tanawali border by his levies.

"On several occasions, too, he has handed over to justice his own subjects who were known to have committed acts of hostility against the British Government.

"The future security of the Tanawali-Agror borders will, in my opinion, be best secured by opening out the communications of the country; and with this view I would strongly advocate the following measures:

- I.—The construction of a good camel road between Agror and Darband down the valley of the Unar stream.
- II.—The maintenance of a good road from Darband along the Indus to our frontier, and if possible beyond as far as Kunhar.
- III.—The maintenance of the camel road from Ughi *via* the Jal pass and Chirmang to Maidan in Nandihar, and if practicable to Paimal.
- IV.—The construction of a good camel road from the Chattar plain *via* Phagora and Batgraon to Maidan.
- V.—The establishment of a post on the Jal Gali to be held by men of the Agror valley who have done good service for Government.

"It is with feelings of the deepest regret that I have to deplore the loss of the late Colonel A. C. W. Crookshank, C.B., commanding the River Column, and of Captain C. H. H. Beley, D.S.O., Deputy Assistant Quarter Master General of the 2nd Brigade.

Commissariat, Medical, &c.

Khaibar Rifles.

Kashmir Contingent.

Local levies.

Future security of Agror frontier.

Loss of officers.

"Colonel Crookshank was an officer who had gained the respect and regard of a large number of his comrades in India as a soldier, and in his private character had won the esteem of a large circle of friends. Wounded on the 5th October, whilst reconnoitring beyond Kotkai, he succumbed to the effects of the wound on the 24th of October, when every hope was entertained of his recovery. In him Her Majesty has lost an able soldier and a commander of promise, and the Indian Government an officer of marked administrative capacity.

"Captain Beley, D.S.O., had already gained distinction in two campaigns, and had graduated at the Staff College. A highly trained officer of natural ability, and possessed, in a marked degree, of soldierly instincts, he gave promise of a brilliant future career. Captain Beley at the outset of the expedition was Deputy Assistant Quarter Master General of the Punjab Frontier Force, and on him fell a large portion of the work of arranging for the passage of troops through the Hazara district, their movement to the front, and for the special sanitary precautions necessitated by the prevalence of cholera. The able way in which these duties were carried out reflected the greatest credit on him. He met a soldier's death on the 4th October, being mortally wounded in a *Ghazi* charge while gallantly pushing forward to the attack of the enemy's position. In his private capacity he had won the affection and esteem of his comrades in the Frontier Force in a marked degree, though only associated with them for a short time. Captain Beley is deeply regretted by all who knew him, and Her Majesty has lost in him a gallant and able servant.

"I have the honor to forward a very full and clear report by Colonel E. L. Ommanney on the political features of the campaign. I am greatly indebted to him and his assistants for the help they have rendered me. Colonel Ommanney, as Chief Political Officer, has conducted all the negotiations with the tribes with tact and firmness, and to this I attribute, in a great measure, the successful results of the expedition. His great experience of frontier matters, and his intimate acquaintance with the tribes on this particular border have been of the greatest assistance to me. I cannot speak too highly of his services, and I would beg that His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief may be pleased to bring them to the notice of the Government of India.

"I would wish to record my deep appreciation of the excellence of the work done generally by the force under my command, and to thank the officers of all corps and departments for the great assistance they have at all times rendered me.

"I would, however, beg to bring to the notice of His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief the names of the following officers and men who are, in my opinion, specially deserving of mention.

Names of officers considered specially deserving of mention.

"To Brigadier-General G. N. Channer, V.C., commanding 1st Brigade, my best thanks are due for the loyal support he has given me throughout the operations, and for the able manner in which he has carried out all the duties entrusted to him. I may mention amongst them the destruction of Seri and Kand; the reconnaissance to the River Column at Kunhar; the operations against the Parari Saiads; the advance on Thakot; the passage of the Ghorapher pass; the advance to, and destruction of, Pokal, and subsequent retirement from Allai,—all of which were carried out under his personal supervision with great promptitude and intelligence, and to my entire satisfaction. I beg to recommend him most strongly for His Excellency's favorable consideration.

"I also beg to bring to His Excellency's favorable notice Brigadier-General W. Galbraith, commanding 2nd Brigade, under whose personal direction the important operations of the River Column, including the brilliant action of Kotkai, the destruction of Maidan (the stronghold of the Hindustani fanatics), and the coercion of the Hassanzai tribe were achieved. For his loyal co-operation with the columns under my own personal direction, on which the ultimate success of the expedition so greatly depended, and for the able manner in which all the operations of the River Column were conceived and executed, my warmest thanks are due to him.

"Colonel J. M. Sym, commanding the 1st Column, has carried out, to my complete satisfaction, many important duties, the responsibility of which during the first phase of the operations fell more directly on him than did similar operations under other column commanders, owing to the detached situation of his column at Chittabat. I may mention among these the affair of Doda, the destruction of Biran, Siala, and Saidra, and the reconnaissance of Machai peak.

"To Colonel O'Grady Haly, commanding 2nd Column, my thanks also are due for the first operations against Kand and the destruction of Dare, which were carried out under his orders.

"Lieutenant-Colonel M. S. J. Sunderland, commanding 3rd Column, is a most able officer, of great promptitude and decision, who has at all times afforded me the greatest assistance. On his column fell the task of capturing the Akhund Baba and Nimal position, which was the key of the Khan Khel Hassanzai and Akazai countries; also the subsequent operations towards Seri, Panji Gali and Pabal, all of which were carried out most satisfactorily by Colonel Sunderland, whose name I desire to bring most favorably to His Excellency's notice.

"I also beg to recommend Colonel H. M. Pratt, who commanded, first the Reserve, and subsequently the River Column, during the final operations against the Akazais and Hassanzais and retirement to Darband. I have every reason to be satisfied with the way this work was done.

"Also Colonel A. Murray, who commanded the 5th Column in the operations against the Parari Saiads, advance to Thakot, and operations in Allai, to my entire satisfaction.

"I desire also to bring to His Excellency's notice the following officers of the headquarters staff:

"Colonel W. F. Gatacre, Deputy Adjutant and Quarter Master General, to whom I am most deeply indebted for his loyal support, constant advice and assistance, and untiring energy. I cannot too highly express my sense of the high qualifications of this officer and the valuable aid I have received from him, and I commend him for His Excellency's most favorable consideration.

"Major E. R. Elles, Assistant Quarter Master General, is a most valuable staff officer and his great ability and sound judgment have been of the greatest assistance to me. I cannot speak too highly of his services throughout the operations.

"I also desire to bring to special notice the good services of Major C. Egerton, Assistant Adjutant General, who has throughout rendered me valuable assistance. On this officer, assisted by the late Captain Beley, fell for nearly three weeks all the preliminary work of the assembly of the Hazara Field Force. Major Egerton is a most valuable officer, of sound judgment and great ability.

"I desire also to mention Captain A. H. Mason, Deputy Assistant Quarter Master General for Intelligence, whose exertions in collecting information regarding the country and the tribes have been of the greatest assistance to me, and under whose direction the survey works on the ridge of the Black Mountain and at Machai were conducted. I have the highest opinion of him as a staff officer and practical soldier.

"I desire also to record my best thanks to the following officers of my personal staff:

"Lieutenant J. S. E. Western, 1st Punjab Cavalry, A.-D.-C., and Captain C. R. Burn, 1st Dragoons, Orderly Officer. Both these officers, besides being of great assistance, have proved themselves on several occasions forward soldiers in the field, and Captain Burn I consider an officer of exceptionable ability and professional knowledge. I have also to thank Major Nawab Afsur Jang, of the Hyderabad army, for the assistance he rendered me during the period he served on my staff as Orderly Officer.

"Colonel Beresford Lovett, C.S.I., commanding Royal Engineers, contributed in a marked degree to the success of the expedition, and I have already referred to the work done in road-making during the campaign.

"Lieutenant-Colonel C. J. Deshon, commanding Royal Artillery, is an officer of great experience with mountain artillery, and I am much indebted to him for good service rendered.

"Deputy Surgeon-General J. H. Thornton, C.B., the Principal Medical Officer of the force, saw carefully to the establishment of the several field hospitals; and the smooth working of everything connected with them was most creditable to him and the medical officers serving under him.

"Captain Goold-Adams has rendered most valuable service by his unremitting attention to the signalling communication between columns. The results of his organization have proved a complete success.

"Major C. M. Keighley, Chief Commissariat Officer, has at all times administered the commissariat arrangements of the force to my entire satisfaction. Supplies of excellent quality have invariably been forthcoming, and the health and the comfort of the troops have been secured by the care and forethought of this officer.

"Captain W. R. Yeilding, Assistant Commissary-General, Divisional Transport Officer, has, under the orders of the Chief Commissariat Officer, ably superintended the transport arrangements of the force. His powers of organization have been shown in a marked degree by the manner in which the large amount of Government and hired transport have been worked with complete success. I consider him a most excellent officer.

"Lieutenant C. P. Scudamore, D.S.O., has acted as assistant to the Divisional Transport Officer, and is an able and indefatigable officer.

"Captain R. A. Wahab, R.E., has been unremitting in his endeavours both with the River Column and during the advance on Thakot and Allai to secure the greatest practicable extension of survey operations and geographical knowledge.

"Sub-Surveyor Imam Sharif, "Khan Bahadur," is deserving of special recognition for the manner in which he conducted survey operations along the crest of the Black Mountain independently.

"Mr. R. C. Barker, Assistant Superintendent of Telegraphs, I would specially bring to the notice of His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief. His work has already been mentioned under "Field Telegraphs," and I cannot speak too highly of the results attained by him.

"Captain Pollard, 7th Bengal Cavalry, who has held political charge of the Kashmir Contingent during the operations, has shown great tact in the management of all matters connected with the Maharaja's troops, and in my opinion deserves great credit for the manner in which these troops have co-operated with the regular troops of the Hazara Field Force.

"I would further bring to the favorable notice of His Excellency the following officers mentioned in brigade and column reports :

Major J. A. Barlow, Deputy Assistant Adjutant General.

Major N. P. O'Gorman, Deputy Assistant Adjutant General.

Major E. E. Money, Deputy Assistant Quarter Master General.

Major A. J. Watson, Brigade-Major.

Lieutenant-Colonel A. J. D. Hawes, 4th Punjab Infantry, who has commanded his regiment with marked ability throughout.

Colonel H. G. Waterfield, commanding 45th Sikhs.

Lieutenant-Colonel A. G. Hammond, V.C., commanding 3rd Sikhs.

Lieutenant-Colonel E. Wardroper, commanding Royal Sussex Regiment.

Lieutenant-Colonel J. L. Vincent, commanding Northumberland Fusiliers.

Major T. Baker, commanding Suffolk Regiment.

Major G. F. Young, officiating commandant, 24th Punjab Infantry, during active operations, an officer of most marked ability.

Captain C. Hogge, commanding wing, 34th Pioneers, who has done most excellent service with his men.

Major H. R. L. Morgan, R.A., } both of whom have done good service with their
Major R. A. C. King, R.A., } fine batteries.

Brigade-Surgeon F. H. Welch, Medical Staff.

Surgeon-Major W. J. Fawcett, Medical Staff.

Surgeon-Major W. R. Murphy, Indian Medical Service.

Surgeon-Major J. T. B. Bookey, Indian Medical Service.

Captain S. Grant, R.E., Field Engineer with the River Column.

Captain C. C. St. E. Lucas, Deputy Assistant Commissary-General.

Lieutenant H. James, Deputy Assistant Commissary-General.

Captain P. T. Buston, R.E., commandant, No. 3 Company, Sappers and Miners.

Captain W. duG. Gray, 4th Punjab Infantry, who specially distinguished himself.

Major R. J. Pike, Suffolk Regiment.

Captain L. E. du Moulin, Royal Sussex Regiment.

Captain F. C. Carter, Northumberland Fusiliers, Field Intelligence Officer, 1st Column.

Captain and Quartermaster P. Campbell, Seaforth Highlanders.

Lieutenant and Quartermaster W. Norris, Suffolk Regiment.

"Major Muhammad Aslam Khan, commandant of the Khaibar Rifles, has fully maintained his reputation as a fine soldier, and has shown his capacity as a gallant leader and commander. I trust His Excellency will see fit to recommend him for some suitable recognition.

"I would also bring to notice the following subordinates, warrant and non-commissioned officers, who have done excellent service :

Commissariat and Transport.

Sub-Conductor J. W. Litchfield	Recommended for a step in rank.
Sergeant Alves	} Recommended for promotion to warrant grade.
" Walters	
" Ryan	

Field Telegraphs.

Mr. Smith	} Sub-Assistant Superintendents.
" Hill	
Company Sergeant-Major Hollis	...		Sappers and Miners.
Sergeant Robertson	Unattached List.
" Hanson, 7th Dragoon Guards.			} Military Signaller.
" Buckland, King's Dragoon Guards.			
			Assistant to Superintendent, Army Signalling.
Corporal Manning, Suffolk Regiment,			Signaller.
Sergeant Ashmore, R.A.	...		Head Clerk, Divisional Head-Quarters."

The Commander-in-Chief in forwarding the despatch of Major-General McQueen, expressed a hope that the records of this expedition would convey to the Government of India the assurance that the army in India is in an efficient condition and ready to undertake any military operations which may be assigned to it.

The following General Order was published by the Government of India in regard to these operations :

G. G. O. No. 978 of 1888.

"His Excellency the Viceroy and Governor-General in Council is pleased to direct the publication of the subjoined letter from the Adjutant-General in India, forwarding a despatch from Major-General McQueen, C.B., A.-D.-C., reporting the operations of the Hazara Field Force during the late campaign.

"The Governor-General in Council cordially endorses the opinions expressed by the Commander-in-Chief in India regarding the skilful manner in which the operations have been carried out, the good conduct and discipline of the troops, and the cheerful endurance by all ranks composing the force of the hardships to which they were exposed.

"His Excellency in Council notes with much satisfaction the reports of the efficient manner in which the onerous duties of the commissariat and the other departments of the army, and of the telegraph department, were performed, and the rapidity with which the considerable transport required for the force was collected.

"The efficient assistance rendered by the troops of the Maharaja of Kashmir and Jamu, the contingent of the Khaibar Rifles, and the local levies, and the cordial co-operation of the Nawab of Amb, have also been noticed with much satisfaction by the Government of India.

"The Governor-General in Council joins with Sir Frederick Roberts, and the General Officers under whom they served, in deploring the loss to the army of the services of the gallant and accomplished officers—Colonel Crookshank and Captain Beley,—who fell in the discharge of their duty.


"The Governor-General desires finally to tender his acknowledgments to General McQueen and the officers and troops under his command for the successful results of the expedition. His Excellency in Council recognizes with the Commander-in-Chief that they testify to the efficiency and high spirit which characterise the army of India."

The Secretary of State in acknowledging the despatches relative to the above operations expressed cordial concurrence in the opinion of the Government of India in respect to the skilful manner in which the operations had been conducted and the satisfactory results that had been achieved.


The Indian medal with a clasp for "Hazara 1888" was subsequently granted to the troops who took part in this expedition against the Black Mountain tribes, between the 3rd October and the 19th November 1888.

G. G. O. No. 431 of 1889.

M A P
OF THE
MOUNTAIN AND ADJOINING COUNTRY
TO ILLUSTRATE
THE OPERATIONS OF THE
AZARA FIELD FORCE
UNDER THE COMMAND OF
MAJOR-GENERAL J. W. McQUEEN, C.B., A.D.C.
IN
October and November 1888.



- REFERENCES
- Routes followed by the force ... ————
- Sites of Bivouacs ↑
- SYMBOLS
- Trigonometrical heights..... Δ 2455
- Barometrical (approximate) heights..... 3610
- Province or State Boundary..... - - - - -



APPENDIX A.

Staff, Hazara Field Force.

A.-B.-C. , McQueen, Major-General J. W., C.B., S.C.	...	Commanding.
Western, Lieutenant J. S. E., 1st Punjab Cavalry	...	Aide-de-Camp.
Burn, Captain C. R., 1st Dragoons	...	Orderly Officer to 4th November 1888.
Fayrer, Lieutenant J. O. S., 1st Battalion, 5th Gurkhas	...	Orderly Officer from 4th November 1888.
Gatacre, Colonel W. F., <i>h. p.</i>	...	Deputy Adjutant and Quarter-master General.
Egerton, Major C. C., 3rd Punjab Cavalry	...	Assistant Adjutant General.
Elles, Major E. R., Royal Artillery	...	Asst. Quarter Master General.
Mason, Captain A. H., Royal Engineers	...	Depy. Asst. Quarter Master General for Intelligence.
Lovett, Colonel B., C.S.I., Royal Engineers	...	Commanding Engineer.
Grant, Captain S., Royal Engineers	...	} Field Engineers.
Abbott, Captain H. E. S., Royal Engineers	...	
Chesney, Lieutenant H. F., Royal Engineers	...	} Assistant Field Engineers.
MacLagan, Lieutenant R. S., Royal Engineers	...	
Gould-Adams, Captain W. R., 1st Dragoon Guards	...	Superintendent, Army Signalling.
Blood, Captain W. P., Royal Irish Fusiliers	...	} Assistant Superintendents, Army Signalling.
Campbell, Lieutenant F., Corps of Guides	...	
Minchin, Lieutenant C. F., 1st Punjab Cavalry	...	}
Birkbeck, Lieutenant W. H., 1st Dragoon Guards	...	
Thornton, Deputy Surgeon-General J. H., C.B., M.B., I.M.S.	...	Principal Medical Officer.
Keighley, Major C. M., Staff Corps	...	Chief Commissariat Officer.
Sparling, Captain J. P., Staff Corps	...	} Commissariat Officers.
Lucas, Captain C. C. St. E., Staff Corps	...	
James, Lieutenant H., Staff Corps	...	
Corfield, Lieutenant C. J., Staff Corps	...	
Hamilton, Lieutenant G. F. D., Staff Corps	...	
Shaw, Captain J., Scottish Rifles	...	} Transport Officers.
Scudamore, Lieutenant C. P., D.S.O., Royal Scots Fusiliers	...	
Moon, Lieutenant W. G., Seaforth Highlanders	...	
Judge, Lieutenant C. B., 1st Battalion, 2nd Gurkhas	...	
Maconchy, Lieutenant E. W. S. K., 4th Sikh Infantry	...	Divisional Transport Officer.
Yeilding, Captain W. R., Staff Corps	...	Field Treasure Chest Officer.
Williams, Captain G. A., Staff Corps	...	Survey Officer.
Wahab, Captain R. A., Royal Engineers	...	Provost Marshal.
Lambert, Captain W., 3rd Punjab Cavalry	...	} Chaplains.
Tribe, Venerable W. H., M.A.	...	
Griffith, Reverend H. W., M.A.	...	
Van Mansfeld, Reverend Fr. H.	...	} Veterinary Surgeon.
Ewing, Veterinary Surgeon E.	...	

First Brigade.

B.-C. , Channer, Brigadier-General G. N., S.C.	...	Commanding.
Money, Lieutenant E. W. K., Shropshire Light Infantry	...	Orderly Officer.
O'Gorman, Major N. P., Lincolnshire Regiment	...	Depy. Asst. Adjutant General.
Money, Major E. E., 11th Bengal Lancers	...	Depy. Asst. Quarter Master General.
Edwards, Lieutenant A. H. M., 1st Dragoon Guards	...	Assistant Provost Marshal.

FIRST COLUMN.

Sym, Colonel J. M., 1st Battalion, 5th Gurkhas	...	Commanding.
Watson, Major A. J., Suffolk Regiment	...	Brigade-Major.

SECOND COLUMN.

Haly, Colonel R. H. O'G., Suffolk Regiment	...	Commanding.
Daniell, Captain A., 1st Punjab Infantry	...	Brigade-Major.

Second Brigade.

Galbraith, Brigadier-General W., <i>h. p.</i>	...	Commanding.
Binning, Captain G. Lord, Royal Horse Guards	...	Orderly Officer.
Barlow, Major J. A., Manchester Regiment	...	Depy. Asst. Adjutant General.
Beley, Captain C. H. H., D.S.O., 25th Bengal Infantry	...	Depy. Asst. Quarter Master General to 4th October 1888.
Southey, Lieutenant R., 3rd Beluchis	...	Depy. Asst. Quarter Master General from 5th to 8th October 1888.
Grierson, Captain J. M., Royal Artillery	...	Depy. Asst. Quarter Master General from 9th October 1888.
DuCane, Captain H. J., Royal Artillery	...	Assistant Provost Marshal.

THIRD COLUMN.

Sunderland, Lieutenant-Colonel M. S. J., Royal Sussex Regiment	...	Commanding.
Irwin, Major L. B., 20th Punjab Infantry	...	Brigade-Major.

FOURTH COLUMN.

Crookshank, Colonel A. C. W., C.B., 34th Pioneers	...	Commanding to 5th October 1888.
Beddy, Colonel E., 29th Punjab Infantry	...	Commanding from 6th to 13th October 1888.
Pratt, Colonel H. M., 2nd Sikhs	...	Commanding from 14th October 1888.
Cave, Major C. D., Suffolk Regiment	...	Brigade-Major.

ARTILLERY.

Deshon, Lieutenant-Colonel C. J., Royal Artillery	...	Commanding.
Drake, Lieutenant F. R., Royal Artillery	...	Adjutant to 31st October 1888.
Dowell, Lieutenant G. C., Royal Artillery	...	Adjutant from 1st November 1888.

RESERVE.

Pratt, Colonel H. M., 2nd Sikhs	...	Commanding to 12th October 1888.
Murray, Colonel A., Seaforth Highlanders	...	Commanding from 12th October 1888.
Fasken, Captain C. G. M., 2nd Sikhs	...	Brigade-Major.

POLITICAL OFFICERS.

Ommanney, Colonel E. L., Commissioner, Peshawar	...	Chief Political Officer.
Cunningham, Mr. A. F. D., C.I.E., Deputy Commissioner, Hazara	...	Second Political Officer.
Inglis, Captain E., Assistant Commissioner, Hazara	...	Assistant Political Officer.
Davis, Mr. W. S., Assistant District Superintendent of Police	...	Assistant Political Officer.

APPENDIX B.

Troops composing the Hazara Field Force on the 1st October 1888.

DISTRIBUTION.				Troops.		Officers.	Men	Horses.	Guns.	Description of guns.	COMMANDERS.	
FIRST COLUMN.				2nd Battn., Northumberland Fusiliers	17	598	6	Lieut.-Col. J. L. Vincent.	
Dilberl.	Officers	...	44	3rd Sikh Infantry	...	9	627	7	A. G. Hammond, v.c.	
	Men	...	2,118	1st Battn., 5th Gurkhas	...	11	622	8	Capt. G. Hawkes.	
	Horses	...	20	Half No. 3 Co., Sappers and Miners	...	2	79	4	P. T. Buxton, R.E.	
SECOND COLUMN.				No. 4 Hazara Mountain Batty.	...	4	157	3	...	7-Pr. R. M. L. 200 lbs.	W. J. Honner, R.A.	
Kalakka	Officers	...	43	Detachment with Gatlings	...	1	3	1	...	Gatlings	N. D. Findlay, R.A.	
	Men	...	2,248	1st Battn., Suffolk Regt.	...	16	550	7	Major T. Baker.	
	Horses	...	40	Wing, 34th Pioneers	...	5	307	5	Capt. C. Hogge.	
THIRD COLUMN.				40th Bengal Infantry	...	9	613	6	Lieut.-Col. E. P. Ommaaney, invalided 20th October 1888.	
Kalakka	Officers	...	45	45th Sikhs	...	9	601	9	Major A. K. Abbott.	
	Men	...	2,364	3-1st, South Irish, Royal Arty.	...	4	177	13	...	25" R. M. L.	Col. H. G. Waterfield.	
	Horses	...	38	2nd Battn., Royal Sussex Regt.	...	21	605	8	Major R. A. C. King.	
FOURTH COLUMN.				14th Sikhs	...	8	617	7	...	25" R. M. L.	Lieut.-Col. W. V. Ellis.	
Darband.	Officers	...	51	24th Punjab Infantry	...	9	610	9	Major G. F. Young, during active operations.	
	Men	...	2,414	Half No. 3 Co., Sappers and Miners	...	2	76	2	Lieut.-Col. B. Wemyss.	
	Horses	...	36	No. 2 Derajat Mountain Batty.	...	2	78	3	...	7-Pr. R. M. L. 200 lbs.	Lieut. J. R. L. Macdonald, R.E.	
RESERVE COLUMN.				Khair Rifles...	...	1	295	1	W. Moore-Lane, R.A.	
Ughit.	Officers	...	40	Royal Irish Regiment	...	21	597	6	Major Muhammad Aslam Khan, C.I.E.	
	Men	...	1,749	20th Punjab Infantry	...	9	618	6	R. K. Brereton, during active operations.	
	Horses	...	544	Head Quarters and Wing, 34th Pioneers	...	5	310	9	Col. G. W. N. Rogers, from England, 25th October 1888.	
Rn route to join.	Officers	...	3	4th Punjab Infantry	...	6	595	9	Lieut. A. F. Hogge.	
	Men	...	1,389	2-1st, Scottish, Royal Arty.	...	2	257	14	...	25" R. M. L.	Lieut.-Col. A. J. D. Hawes.	
	Horses	...	57	Detachment with Gatlings	...	1	37	1	...	Gatlings	Major H. R. L. Morgan, R.A.	
Staff, &c.	Officers	...	46	Seaforth Highlanders	...	21	601	11	Lieut. M. S. Eyre, R.E.	
	Men	...	1,749	15th Bengal Cavalry	...	11	514	527	Col. A. Murray, took command Reserve Col., 12th Oct. '88.	
	Horses	...	50	2nd Sikhs	...	8	634	6	Major R. Garnett, assumed command, 12th Oct. '88.	
TOTAL				Kashmir Contingent	...	3	1,389	57	...	Brass guns	E. D. H. Vihart.	
				Staff, &c.	...	46	...	56	Col. H. M. Pratt, took command 4th Col., 14th Oct. '88.	
					...	272	12,382	800	24		F. E. Hastings, assumed command 14th Oct. '88.	
					...	272	12,382	800	24		Genl. Indar Singh.	
					...	272	12,382	800	24		Capt. W. C. Pollard, Political Officer.	

(Sd.) J. W. McQUEEN, Major-General,
Commanding Hazara Field Force.

APPENDIX C.

Standing Orders, Hazara Field Force, 1888.

THE following Standing Orders are published for the guidance of all officers serving with the Hazara Field Force and are to be strictly adhered to as far as circumstances permit. Officers commanding columns will see that these orders are thoroughly explained by officers commanding corps and departments, to all officers, non-commissioned officers and men under their command.

2. *Camps and Bivouacs.*—The strict attention of brigadiers and column commanders is directed to the sanitary arrangements of camps and bivouacs. In camps latrines are to be provided for all troops and followers, British and Native, and the provost marshal will be directed to take severe notice of any infringement of the rules laid down. The greatest care must be taken to keep the supply of drinking-water unpolluted and sentries will be posted with this object. Column commanders will arrange for police and for duties in camp. The quartermaster and medical officer of the day will report verbally to the brigade major of the column as to the sanitary state of camps.

During the advance when there will be no regular camps, latrines will be provided when practicable and night latrines constructed within the line of sentries. Where owing to the nature of the soil day latrines cannot be constructed, men must be prohibited from proceeding for purposes of nature beyond the outlying picquets.

In standing camps latrines are to be distinguished by a flag and fresh trenches are to be dug daily, the old ones being filled in. All followers are to be provided with passes, forms for which can be obtained from the Provost Marshal.

Whenever a native follower is sent into hospital a memorandum showing the regiment, corps or department to which he belongs, the articles in his possession and the date up to and for which he has been paid and rationed is to be sent with him.

3. *Marches and Baggage.*—In all columns of route the following order is to be observed.

Reserve ammunition, *pakhals*, *dandis*, entrenching tools, and hospital panniers are to accompany each regiment or battery, following immediately in its rear.

In a column organized for hill warfare, it is essential to have each unit complete in itself as in a defile or narrow path it would be impossible to get up ammunition or *dandis* from the rear without great loss of time.

All followers not required with the above named establishments, &c., are to accompany the baggage of their corps and generally assist the baggage guard. They should not be allowed to leave their respective guards.

The transport officer of each column will act as column baggage master and all baggage and guards will be under his orders. He will see that it moves off the ground in the following order:

Field Hospital.

Staff baggage.

Regimental baggage (including supplies) according to the order of march.

Transport officers will remember that their duty lies entirely with the baggage and not with the column.

Each infantry regiment (British and Native) will detail a baggage guard of 30 non-commissioned officers and men. In the case of British regiments an officer, and in native corps a native officer, will be placed in charge (batteries to detail a proportional number under a non-commissioned officer). Baggage guards to move by sections under orders of the commander of the guard, and in no case should single men or files be allowed.

These guards will attend to the adjustment of displaced loads, &c., and see that animals and followers do not leave the line of march.

As the work demanded of the baggage animals is likely to be severe, the Major-General commanding directs the most careful attention to the adjustment of loads. An ill-packed load means delay and probably a sore back, and transport officers will pay unceasing attention to this point on the line of march.

Commanding officers will be held strictly responsible that the limits of baggage for each rank are strictly adhered to. Prior to the advance all corps will parade in complete

marching order as for the final advance (this includes officers and followers), for the inspection of the column commanders who will satisfy themselves that the loads are correctly packed and within the prescribed weights. In all cases the allowance of spare animals will march unloaded.

Mounted officers will be allowed to take only one horse or pony beyond the base.

No dogs are to accompany troops beyond the standing camps.

The employment by officers, of guards or orderlies with their baggage (except as directed above), is strictly prohibited.

4. *Contact with the enemy.*—In the ascent of a long hill or spur the leading scouts and extended line, followed closely by their supports, should proceed very slowly halting occasionally on marked defensible knolls or ridges to enable the main column and baggage to close up and also that the men may not be fatigued by too rapid and continuous an advance.

When within effective rifle range of the enemy's position, say, 800 or 900 yards, the extended line should halt and information of the enemy's position should be sent back to the officer commanding the column. Fire should not be opened without orders. The column commander will then make his dispositions for attack. Suitable positions should be sought for to enable the artillery and infantry to cover the advance of the attacking force. The latter should then if possible advance slowly without firing towards their objective point; the supports well up in a closely extended line. The artillery and covering infantry being mainly trusted to keep down the fire of the enemy.

When nearing the enemy's position (about 250 yards off) bayonets should be fixed and the line prepared for a sudden charge of the enemy's swordsmen. This charge should be met by very slow and deliberate individual firing.

The superiority of our weapons give us great advantage over any odds in numbers, and experience proves that while a steady front will inevitably check an Afghan rush the slightest giving way will surely lead to mischief.

When advancing to attack up a steep hill on no account is there to be any rushing from ridge to ridge or from cover to cover, a slow steady advance without much firing is the surest way of gaining the objective. Officers should remember that they must not lead their men too quickly, and regulate their own pace to the condition of the men and nature of the ground, keeping the line as much intact as possible and avoiding undue separation from their supports.

In retiring off a hill a party should be left on the top, to cover the retirement. In this manner successive positions should be occupied on the slopes down the hill.

In retiring over ground not previously traversed, scouts must always be employed to give timely notice of difficult or precipitous places and to show the best line of retirement.

The attention of officers commanding columns is particularly directed to this point.

In hill warfare, whether in advancing or retiring, supports must be kept much closer to the fighting line than on ordinary ground.

5. *Outposts and picquets.*—Before taking up a position for a bivouac, brigadiers or column commanders will satisfy themselves that the ground selected offers fair defensive conditions. Picquets will be posted immediately on arrival and alarm posts assigned to each unit. When the column halts preparatory to taking up its bivouac, telling off picquets, &c., the advanced guard will form temporary picquets.

Picquets will invariably take precautions to make their posts defensible against attack by *sangars* or other means, and care must be taken that the work is placed in the best position possible for defensive purposes. Sentries should be so posted that they can see and hear without themselves being seen. There is no objection to their sitting down, if this object can thereby be better attained. Officers and non-commissioned officers in charge of picquets will take every precaution to ascertain the business of persons approaching their posts by day. Under no circumstances should any men or parties be allowed to approach a post or sentry at night.

Officers in command of picquets are responsible that their men have their several posts assigned to them, and that they are properly acquainted with the positions of the camp and of the picquets immediately adjacent, as well as the direction of the enemy. As the nights are likely to be very dark, sentries must be cautioned to trust more to their sense of hearing than to their eyesight to warn them of the approach of the enemy.

Picquets and sentries should not fire at night, except in some real emergency. It is a frequent practice with hill men to try and draw fire at night merely with the object of causing annoyance and harassing the troops. If no notice be taken of their desultory firing, it may possibly cause them to desist. Officers should make themselves acquainted with the dress of the Kashmir Contingent, Khaibar Rifles and levies.

6. *Night Alarms.*—On an alarm taking place the men should fall in at the alarm posts of their corps and await orders. Strict silence must be maintained.

7. *Miscellaneous—Foraging.*—When foraging parties are sent out the escort is to be so placed as to see all the men employed and prevent any straying beyond certain limits, to be fixed by whoever commands the party.

8. *Signalling parties.*—All regimental signallers are to be placed at the disposal of the Superintendent of Signalling for employment either as divisional signallers or with their respective columns.

Column commanders are responsible that suitable guards are told off daily to accompany signalling parties.

9. *Survey Parties.*—It is notified for general information that on all occasions of detachments under a British officer accompanying survey parties, the command and responsibility devolve absolutely on the officer commanding the escort who will make all arrangements for the protection of the surveyors and decide as to the advisability or otherwise of visiting particular localities, having regard to the strength of the escort and the character and temper of the inhabitants.

10. *Orders and Reports.*—No verbal reports or messages of any kind are to be sent in by officers on detached duty. All officers should provide themselves with note-books and pencils and send in written reports.

All orders in camp should be written and the staff officer despatching them should obtain a written acknowledgment of their delivery.

In the field all orders should if possible be written and the time of despatch noted on the order.

11. *Time.*—Telegraph time (hours numbered from 1 to 24 commencing from midnight) will be kept in camp and in the field.

12. *Chargers.*—Officers should register their chargers with the staff officers of their respective columns in view to compensation being paid if killed during the operations.

13. *Camp Guards.*—On the advance of the columns across the border each regiment will leave an officer and 40 men for the protection of their camps (in the case of a native regiment, a native officer). The senior officer will be in charge of the camps of the several corps of each column, tents should be struck and baggage collected in a central position to economize sentries.

14. *Working Parties.*—Working parties will invariably take their arms with them.

15. *Communication between Columns.*—Signalling between the columns will be maintained whenever practicable. Officers commanding columns will communicate movements and events and any important information at least once a day to the Major-General commanding, who will march with the 3rd Column until further notice.

16. *Telegraphs.*—Press and private messages can only be sent from field telegraph offices under the orders contained in paragraphs 11, 12, 13 and 14 of the "Rules for Field Telegraph Offices, 1888."

APPENDIX D.

Cases outstanding against the different tribes previous to the Expedition being sanctioned.

List of offences committed by Hassanzai.

Responsibility for the conduct of their chief, Hashim Ali Khan, as they were informed in 1884. This responsibility was enforced in respect of the raid on Udigraon in January 1888, by the blockade of the whole tribe.

List of offences committed by Hassanzai Khan Khel.

Several murders committed by Khan Khel and servants of Hashim Ali Khan in 1880.

Raid on Kalakka, 28th March 1883, led by Hashim Ali Khan.

Raid on Udigraon, 9th January 1888; 2 men killed, 2 kidnapped.

Responsibility for the attack on Major Battye's party on the 18th June 1888, and killing a Jaskot villager.

List of offences committed by Akazai.

Raid on Belian and Bholu, May 1884.

Raid by 400 men on Belian, 19th June 1884, in which 4 men were killed and 14 wounded—British subjects.

Several raids and offences in 1885, 1886 and 1887.

Responsibility for the attack on Major Battye's party on the 18th June 1888.

List of offences committed by Parariwals.

Raid on cattle of Sakhi Shah of Bagrian, 11th July 1887.

Murder of Nur Jamal, 21st August 1887.

Arrest and detention of Gul Hassan and Fazl Din, British subjects, March 1888.

Possession of stolen property; four stolen bullocks traced to Saidra.

Theft of some goats, July 1888.

Robbery of and wounding Mahmud of Bagrian, 28th July 1888.

List of offences committed by Tikariwals.

Association in a raid on cattle of Sakhi Shah of Bagrian, 11th July 1887.

Murder of Ghutai, 2nd August 1887, at Landi Dakhili Kabbal, Agror.

Possession of stolen property; five stolen cattle, value Rs. 65, traced to Ranja near Darian.

Kidnapping two women from Lambi Chabhar Dakhili Kabbal, Agror (restored in four days).

List of offences committed by Allaiwals.

Attack on Mr. Scott's survey party in 1868.

Raid on Battal, 16th November 1877; 2 men killed, 14 kidnapped, and property valued at Rs. 37,000 carried off.

Raid on Jabbar, 9th December 1877; 5 men wounded, 1 woman kidnapped, and Rs. 1,876 in property carried off.

Two raids on Gujar camps on the northern corner of the Bogarmang glen above Jabbar, 4th July 1887; 1 woman killed, 3 men wounded, and cattle carried off of which the greater number were subsequently recovered.

APPENDIX E.

To the Maliks of Kunhar, Kandar, Garhi, Nawe Kili, Palosi, &c., and to all Sections of the Hassanzai Clan, except the Khan Khel.

WHEREAS Hashim Ali Khan, the chief of your clan, has committed many heinous crimes in British territory, and in this has been secretly countenanced by some and hindered or controlled by none of you; and whereas it is the intention of the British Government to send an army to punish him, it is hereby notified to you that if you, nine sections of the Hassanzai, make timely and full submission, and accept and carry out the following terms, your country will be spared. If you do not accept and fulfil these terms, you also will be punished.

The terms are these—

First.—That you take from Hashim Ali Khan, and restore unconditionally, the two British subjects whom he kidnapped,—Saiad Alam and Haiat-ulla.

Second.—That you pay the fine imposed on the Khan Khel, *viz.*, Rs. 5,000, whether in cash, in cattle, or in arms; or you may, if you prefer, deliver up to Government the following Khan Khel *maliks*, and if you do this, the fine will be reduced, that is to say, for the surrender of Hashim Ali Khan Rs. 3,500 will be remitted. For surrender of each of the following—Sikandar Khan, Shekh Ata Muhammad, Turabaz Khan, Khan Khel, Rs. 500 will be remitted. You can choose whether to deliver them up or pay their fine.

Third.—As you allowed the Hindustanis twice to cross the Indus and come to the border of British territory with hostile intent, you are to pay for this Rs. 300 fine.

Fourth.—You are to deliver up as hostages two *maliks* or *motabars* per section.

Fifth.—You are to suffer British troops to march unmolested through your country; no opposition to be shown, nor a hostile shot fired, by any of you.

Sixth.—You are to accept for the future complete responsibility for the conduct of your *Khan*.

Seventh.—Whenever it pleases Government, troops or servants of Government shall march freely and without opposition from you along the border of British territory on the Black Mountain.

You should inform the Khan Khel Hassanzai that their villages will be spared, provided they surrender Hashim Ali Khan, not otherwise. Lastly, it is made known to you that no *jirga*, or deputation of your tribe, will be received unless it comes to offer full submission and prepared to give effect to the terms, above mentioned, to the Commissioner of Peshawar at Ughi before midday of the 2nd October, corresponding to 25th Moharram 1305. (*Sent on the 23rd September 1888.*)

To Bahadur Khan, Khan Khel of Maira; Ibrahim Khan, Khan Khel now of Shergarh; Ghulam Kadir Khan, Khan Khel now of Shergarh; and other maliks of the Khan Khel.

YOU are aware of all the offences and crimes which the Khan Khel, under Hashim Ali Khan of Seri, have committed in Agror; it is the intention of the British Government to send an army to punish him and you. It is hereby notified to you that if you deliver Hashim Ali Khan up to the British Government, your villages will be spared; if not you will be severely punished. If you wish to submit and fulfil this condition, you should come in, and deliver up Hashim Ali Khan, to the Commissioner of Peshawar at Ughi before midday of 2nd October, corresponding to 25th Moharram. After that no *jirga* will be received. (*Sent on the 23rd September 1888.*)

To Mir Jamal, Nur Ahmad, Aziz Khel of Led; Dad Khan, Mauladad, Alfu Khan, Tasan Khel of Bimbal and Kambala; Husain Khan, Shahdad Khan, Saiad Wali Khan, Hasu Khan, Barat Khel of Biliani; Asim Khan, Rashid Khan, Hazrat Nur Khan, Abdulla Khan, Nur Khan of Kand, Painsa Khel; and to all the maliks and clan of the Akazai.

WHEREAS your clansmen have for years past not ceased to commit crimes in British territory, therefore it is the intention of the British Government to send an army to punish

you. It is hereby made known to you that if you accept and fulfil the following terms, you will escape further punishment, otherwise your country will be laid waste and you will be more severely punished.

Those terms are these—

First.—That you pay a fine of Rs. 4,000 in arms, cattle, or cash as you please; if you seize and deliver up the chief men (*motabars*) among the Gujars and Leds who attacked Major Battye, this fine will be reduced.

Second.—That you surrender two *maliks* per section as hostages for your good conduct.

Third.—That you collect and restore the arms and personal property which were robbed from the bodies of officers and men of Major Battye's party.

Fourth.—That you fully and finally accept and admit that you have no claim or title to any proprietorship or rights of cultivation in Shatut.

Fifth.—That you suffer troops to march unmolested through your country, and that not a hostile shot be fired at them.

Sixth.—The hamlet of Chapra is to be destroyed in any case, and in future you are not to erect any hamlets or squat east of the crest of the Black Mountain.

Seventh.—You will be held in future jointly responsible with the Hassanzai for the conduct of your *Khan*, Hashim Ali Khan, Khan Khel.

Eighth.—British troops and servants of the British Government are in future to move freely unmolested or unopposed by any of you along the border of British territory on the Black Mountain. (*Sent on the 23rd September 1888.*)

TO THE PARARIWALS.

To Mian Saiad of Garhi; Muhammad Ali Shah of Bilandkot; Ghazi Shah of Saidra; Latif Shah of Parari; Ghulam Shah of Parari; Mian Jam Din of Garhi; Shah Didar, Chagarzai, and to all Saiads and motabars of Parari.

You are aware that the Khan Khel and Akazai have committed many offences in British territory. By order of Government, you are informed that it is the intention of Government to send an army to punish them. You know also all the crimes which you, *Saiads* and Chagarzai of Parari, have committed in Agror. For these Government has ordered that you pay a fine of Rs. 1,500 and give six hostages from among your principal men, three *Saiads* and three Chagarzai. If you pay this fine and surrender hostages by 2nd October—the 25th Moharram,—well and good. If you do not, you will be punished and your country will suffer. As to hostages you can choose three out of the following *Saiads*, *viz.*, Mian Saiad of Garhi; Mian Jam Din of Garhi; Latif Shah of Parari; Ghulam Shah of Parari; but Muhammad Ali Shah must be one of the three and Sharaba and Shah Didar must be among the three Chagarzai hostages. (*Sent on the 19th September 1888.*)

To Ghafar Khan of Trand; Rahim Khan of Chirmang; Nawab Khan of Darian; Abbas Khan of Gidrai; Painsa Khan of Taya; Khanizaman Khan of Plan Peza; and all maliks and motabars of Tikari.

WHEREAS the British Government is about to send an army to punish certain tribes of the Black Mountain for offences which are well known to you, and whereas many residents in Tikari have been concerned in these crimes, and you have not prevented them from murder and kidnapping in British territory, this letter is written to inform you all that for these offences, for which you are responsible, the British Government has imposed on you a fine of Rs. 1,000.

If your *jirga* comes in and makes submission and pays this fine to the Commissioner at Ughi by midday 2nd October, corresponding to 25th Moharram, well and good. If not, you will be severely punished. (*Sent on the 23rd September 1888.*)

APPENDIX F.

To the Maliks and Firga of the Deshis.

BE it known to you that the British Government is about to send troops to punish the Khan Khel, the Akazai, and the people of Parari for the crimes and offences which they have committed in British territory. The British Government has no quarrel with you, and will not harm or injure you, but if you move from your homes to assist the above tribes, or if you commit any act of hostility, then you will be punished. (*Sent on the 23rd September 1888.*)

To the Maliks of Nandihar.

Letter to the same effect as above. (*Sent on the 23rd September 1888.*)

To the Maliks of the Mada Khel.

YOU are well aware of the many offences which the Khan Khel and Akazai have committed within the British territory. By order of Government I am directed to tell you that an army is about to be sent to punish them for their crimes. Between you and the British Government there is friendship and peace, and no harm will be done to you or your country, provided you remain peaceably in your homes. If any of you cross the river Indus to assist the Khan Khel or Akazai, or if you offer opposition, you will be liable to punishment with them. (*Sent on the 19th September 1888.*)

To the Maliks of the Chagarzai of Pakban, Gitai, Kalish, &c., Basi Khel and Nasrat Khel.

Letter is to the same purport as that addressed to the Mada Khel, substituting for the words "cross the river Indus" the words "leave your own country." (*Sent on the 19th September 1888.*)

APPENDIX G.

Translation of a letter (ultimatum) sent to Hashim Ali Khan on 9th October 1888, by the Chief Political Officer, Hazara Field Force.

HASHIM ALI KHAN, KHAN KHEL HASSANZAI,—

On account of constant crimes committed by you, about which you have sufficient knowledge, today Government troops entered your villages and other villages attached to it and burnt them; they also demolished some parts of these villages. Standing crops and the remaining houses have not been destroyed, as it causes destruction and distress to the families and children of the inhabitants of these villages in the coming winter. If troops remain here in the winter, it will be most injurious to the villagers. A further opportunity is therefore given you to surrender yourself, together with Shekh Ata Muhammad, Sikandar Khan, and Turabaz, your relatives, unconditionally, to the General commanding, and you should give up the two British subjects. Your life will be spared, and you will have to carry out the orders that may be given you by Government on making the above-mentioned surrenders.

Ultimatum sent to the Akazai jirga on 9th October 1888, by the Chief Political Officer, Hazara Field Force, viz., to Asim Khan, Rashid Khan, Alfu Khan, Nur Khan, Saiad Miran, Hazratulla, Aslam, Mauladad, Dad Khan, Shah Saiad, &c., whole jirga of Akazais.

You have been previously informed of the terms proposed for you on account of repeated crimes committed by yourselves and your tribe, but up to the present moment you have done nothing in the way of compliance with those terms. British troops will therefore enter your country tomorrow, and will burn and destroy some of your villages, but the walls of these villages and of other villages and standing crops in your country will not be destroyed till further orders, as such burning of the other villages and demolition of the walls of the burnt villages and the loss of the standing crops and stacks will, in the next winter, tend to ruin yourselves, and will be a great trouble and misery to the families and children of your tribe, especially if British troops remain in your country until you comply with the terms. A second opportunity is therefore given you to collect a complete jirga and to come in to the General to comply with the terms already intimated to you, and about which you have full knowledge. Your life will be safe. You may act as you please.

APPENDIX H.

Distribution of Troops, Hazara Field Force, on the Evening of the 20th October, 1888.

Divisional head-quarters	}	Mana-ka-Dana.
Head-quarters, 1st Brigade	}	

FIRST COLUMN.

Column head-quarters	}	Mana-ka-Dana.
4 guns, Hazara Mountain Battery	}	
Northumberland Fusiliers	}	
1 company, Seaforth Highlanders	}	
½ No. 3 Company, Sappers and Miners	}	
3rd Sikhs	}	
1-5th Gurkhas	}	
Wing, 34th Pioneers	}	

SECOND COLUMN.

Column head-quarters	}	Chittabat.
2 guns, Derajat Mountain Battery	}	
Suffolk Regiment	}	
Head-quarters and wing, 45th Sikhs	}	
Wing, 45th Sikhs (to rejoin their head-quarters on 21st).	}	Nimal.

THIRD COLUMN.

Column head-quarters	}	Karun.
2 guns, 3-1 South Irish, Royal Artillery	}	
Royal Sussex Regiment	}	
Wing, 24th Punjab Infantry (moves to Karun 21st)	}	Akhund Baba.
Head-quarters and wing, 24th Punjab Infantry	}	Nimal.
½ No. 3 Company, Sappers and Miners	}	Tilli.
14th Sikhs	}	

FOURTH COLUMN.

Column head-quarters	}	Led.
2 guns, 2-1 Scottish, Royal Artillery	}	
Royal Irish Regiment	}	
29th Punjab Infantry	}	
Head-quarters, 2nd Brigade	}	
4 guns, 2-1 Scottish, Royal Artillery	}	
4 companies, Seaforth Highlanders	}	
4th Punjab Infantry	}	Kunhar.
4 companies, 34th Pioneers	}	
Detachments, Royal Irish and 29th Punjab Infantry	}	
2 Gatlings	}	
Section Field Hospital	}	
4 companies, 2nd Sikhs	}	Kotkai.
2 companies, 2nd Sikhs	}	Shingri.
1 troop, 15th Bengal Cavalry	}	
2 companies, 2nd Sikhs	}	Darband.
Base Hospital	}	

RESERVE COLUMN.

Column head-quarters	} Dilbori.
4 guns, 3-1 South Irish, Royal Artillery	
200 Seaforth Highlanders	
Wing, 40th Native Infantry	
Khaibar Rifles	
2 Gatlings	} Ughi.
4 troops, 15th Bengal Cavalry	
Depôt, Seaforth Highlanders	
Depôts, 2nd and 3rd Columns	Kalakka.
Depôt, 1st Column	Dilbori.

APPENDIX I.

Agreement made by Hassanzai Firga at Ughi on the 9th November 1888.

WE the undersigned *maliks* of the Hassanzai clan, representing all sections except the Khan Khel, for ourselves, for the *maliks* who are absent, and for our whole clan, declare and agree as follows:

1. In obedience to the orders of the British Government, we have caused Hashim Ali Khan, Khan Khel, to release the British subjects who remained in his hands, and we have paid the fine imposed upon us, *viz.*, Rs. 7,500, by surrendering cattle of that value.
2. We agree to give up such *maliks* as may be demanded, to be kept by Government as hostages for our good behaviour during the pleasure of Government.
3. We admit our responsibility for the behaviour of the *Khan* of the Khan Khel whoever he may be; that is, we as a tribe are responsible to control the *Khan* whom we may elect as chief, and to prevent him from committing or instigating offences in British territory.
4. The troops, or servants, or officials of the British Government are not to be molested if they march on the Black Mountain anywhere within British territory, or along the crest of the mountain on the boundary between our country and the territory of the British Government.
5. We bind ourselves not to injure any of the roads which the British Government has made within our country.

Marks, seals, and signatures follow.

Agreement made by Akazai Firga at Kain Gali on the 19th October 1888.

WE, the headmen of the Akazai tribe, have today, before the Commissioner of Peshawar at Kain Gali, agreed to the following terms for ourselves and on behalf of the whole of the Akazai tribe:

- I.—We will pay the fine of Rs. 4,000 to the British Government on account of offences formerly committed by ourselves and our tenantry in British territory in cash or cattle. This fine will be paid by Friday, the 26th October 1888. We may, if we can, surrender to the Government some of the leading Gujars and *Saiads* who were concerned in the attack upon Major Battye. For such surrender the illustrious Government will remit such portion of the above fine as they consider advisable.
- II.—We, the headmen of the Akazai tribe, will surrender two *maliks* from each section of our tribe as hostages to the Government. At present, from amongst our deputation, the following five *maliks*, *viz.*, 1. Asim Khan, Pinda Khel; 2. Hazratulla Khan, Pinda Khel; 3. Alfu Khan, Tasa Khel; 4. Gujar Khan, Barat Khel; 5. Mir Jamal, Aziz Khel, will remain as hostages with the Government. The remaining *maliks* of our *firga* will go back to arrange for the collection of the fine, which, after being realized, will be paid by a full *firga* before the British authorities, and at that time the Government will take, according to their pleasure, further hostages. These hostages will remain with the Government during the pleasure of the Government; that is to say, that they will remain with the Government until the Government is satisfied with the good behaviour of our tribe.
- III.—We will try our best to recover all the arms or other property taken from Major Battye and Gurkha soldiers, which may be found in our country, or in the possession of our tribe or our tenantry, and we will return it to the Government.

IV.—We, the leading men of the Akazai tribe, bind ourselves on behalf of the whole tribe that in future we shall lay no claim to Shatut ; that we shall have no claim to the lands belonging to Shatut : and we shall have no connection with them. No member of the Akazai tribe, or any tenant of theirs, will have claim to proprietary or agricultural rights in Shatut land. Further, we agree on behalf of the whole of the Akazai tribe that whatever arrangements may be made by the British Government for the occupation or cultivation of the said lands, no Akazai will interfere with those arrangements.

V.—As troops will remain in our country until the above terms are fulfilled, we, the Akazai *jirga*, promise that none of the soldiers or other Government servants will be molested in any way by Akazai people or their tenants.

VI.—Hereafter no Akazais or their tenants will build any kind of building or graze their cattle to the east of the waterflow line of the Black Mountain on the Agror side ("Hurda Pani"). We have no right of any kind in that part of the country, and we will not interfere in any way with it.

VII.—As our tribe is a branch or sub-section of the Isazai tribe, and the Khan of Seri is the chief of all the three sections of the Isazai tribe, we the Akazais, like our brethren the Hassanzais, hold ourselves responsible for the conduct of the *Khan* of the Khan Khels of Seri.

VIII.—We bind ourselves that in future troops or officials of the British Government are not to be molested if they march on the Black Mountain anywhere within British territory, or along the crest of the mountain, on the boundary between our country and the territory of the British Government. We will not interfere in any way, and if we think that any loss has been caused to us by such marching we will apply to the Deputy Commissioner in Abbottabad by petition.

P.S.—We have been allowed to pay the fine either in cash or in kind to the General commanding the River Column on the bank of the Indus, or to the General commanding the troops at Karun in the Khan Khel country, and afterwards we will send a full *jirga* of our tribe to the Commissioner of the Peshawar division at Ughi.

P.S.—Dad Khan will remain a hostage *vice* Alf Khan and Hassan Khan *vice* Gujar Khan.

Marks, seals, and signatures follow.

APPENDIX J.

Orders sent on the 26th October 1888 to Arsala Khan, Lal Khan, Saiad Wali Khan, Painsa Khan, Bahadur Khan, Abdulla Khan, Mir Jalal Khan, &c., Maliks and Headmen of Allai, by Colonel E. L. Ommanney, Chief Political Officer, Hazara Field Force.

BE it known to you that, after subduing the Black Mountain tribes, British troops have arrived in Nandihar. It has been intimated to you before, and another opportunity is given you now, that, on account of the former offences committed by you and your tribes in British territory, the Government has two terms for you,—

(1) Personal submission of Arsala Khan before the General Officer Commanding on the 30th October 1888 (Tuesday). He will not be imprisoned or detained; he will be dismissed after making his submission and paying his respects.

(2) Payment of Rs. 6,500 fine imposed upon you and your tribe for offences formerly committed by you and your tribe, or in lieu of fine surrender of three hostages from your (Arsala Khan's) relatives or respectable leading *maliks* of your tribe, who will be kept by the Government till they are satisfied with the conduct of your tribe and yourselves; also to let the survey party (officer), escorted by some troops, go to the crest of the hill dividing Allai from Nandihar, to see the country.

If these terms are fulfilled, your villages, crops, and country will not be burnt or destroyed by British troops, and the families and children of your tribe and yourselves will be safe from such loss in this cold winter season.

The following was added to the copies sent to the leading men of Allai, in addition to the above sent to Arsala Khan :

“P.S.—The above-mentioned fine of Rs. 6,500 is imposed upon all the Allai tribes by the Government, and if the tribes will pay in the fine imposed immediately, their villages will be spared.”

APPENDIX K.

HASSANZAI.

(Lower 9 Sections).

Villages burnt.

Half of Palosi.
Garhi.
Part of Kunhar.
Kotkai.
Shingri or Kandar.

Tegraon.
Bakrai.
Makranai.
Sil.
Ranzur.

Villages occupied.

Kotkai.
Kunhar.
Palosi.

Tilli.
Kunari.
Bakrai.

Gazikot.

HASSANZAI (KHAN KHEL).

Villages burnt.

Seri.
Merabad.
Kohani.
Karun.
Ril.
Meira.

Selle.
Abu.
Sabe.
Naranj.
Karwai.
Urmal.

Ashkot.

Villages occupied.

Seri.

Karun.

HINDUSTANIS.

Village burnt.

Maidan.

AKAZAI.

Villages burnt.

Dare.
Biran.
Kand (Bar).

Kand (Kuz).
Chapra.
Doda.

Village occupied.

Led.

PARARIWALS.

Villages burnt.

Saidra.
Siala.
Kanganbaffa.

Mirtob, hamlet of
Bilandkot.
Garhi and its hamlets.
Kopra and its hamlets.

Kotwal and its hamlets.

Village occupied.

Bilandkot.

THAKOTIS.

Villages destroyed.

Lora and tower.

Daut (tower).

Mirazai.

ALLAIWALS.

Village destroyed.

Pokal and tower.

APPENDIX L.

Translation of an Agreement made by the whole of the Tikari Jirga of Ashlor, Malkal, and Naror Sections made at Ughi on the 14th November 1888.

WE, the whole Tikari *jirga* of Ashlor, Malkal, and Naror sections, agree as follows ourselves and on behalf of the other *maliks* not present here :

1. We hold ourselves responsible and answerable for any offence committed by any member of our tribe, or any residents of our country, in British territory.
2. We, our tribe, and the residents of our country will not allow any member of any other tribes to pass through the limits of our country to commit any offence in British territory.
3. We promise that the roads constructed by the British Government in our country in the present expedition will be maintained uninjured by ourselves and our tribe.

Marks, seals, and signatures follow.

APPENDIX M.

G. G. O. No. 123 of 1889.

The Governor-General in Council is pleased to admit the undermentioned native officers, non-commissioned officers and sepoy of the Khaibar Rifles to the 3rd class of the Order of Merit :

Subadar-Major Mir Akbar Khan.—For conspicuous gallantry on the following occasions :

1. On the 8th October 1888, at the attack on Abu village, Black Mountain, in having, single-handed charged five or six of the enemy, and saved the life of a wounded sepoy.
2. On the 24th October 1888, at the attack on the village of Garhi, when he was the first man to enter the village under a heavy fire.
3. On the 1st November 1888, at the capture of the Ghorapher pass, when he led the right attack and displayed great personal bravery.
4. On the 3rd November 1888, at the attack on Pokal, when he led his men over difficult ground under a heavy fire, and cleared the enemy from the left flank, inflicting on them heavy loss.
5. On the same occasion, in having carried a wounded sepoy to a place of safety under a heavy fire during an attack on the rear guard, when returning from Pokal.
6. On the 4th November 1888, in having with thirty of his men dislodged a large body of the enemy who were occupying the summit of the Chaila mountain.

Jemadar Muhammad Ghalli (Madgalli).—For conspicuous gallantry on the following occasions :

1. On the 10th October 1888, at the attack on Kand, Black Mountain, Hazara, when he led the attack and was the first man to enter the village.
2. On the 12th October 1888, in having with four sepoy driven thirty or forty of the enemy out of a village near Betband.
3. On the 15th October 1888, in having, near the village of Makranai, when in command of a flanking party, during the return march from Kunhar, rushed forward with a few of his men and repulsed a party of the enemy who had opened fire from the heights.
4. On the 28th October 1888, in the vicinity of Thakot, in having with a picquet dislodged the enemy from a *sangar*, killing several of their number.
5. On the 1st November 1888, in having, at the capture of the Ghorapher pass, been conspicuously to the front in storming the heights under a heavy fire.
6. On the 3rd November 1888, in having, when returning from Pokal, during a series of most determined attacks on the rear guard, been the last to leave his position, on each occasion allowing the enemy to come to close quarters, and thus securing the retirement of his men.

Naik Habib.—For conspicuous gallantry on the 28th October 1888, in the vicinity of Thakot, Black Mountain, Hazara, in having with three sepoy captured a *sangar* occupied by the enemy.

Sepoy Akhtar Shah.—For conspicuous gallantry on the 8th October 1888, in having, in the attack on the Abu village, been the first man to reach the village under a heavy fire. On this occasion he was severely wounded.

No. 29, Sepoy Mir Abbas and No. 583, Sepoy Ajar Din.—For conspicuous gallantry on the 1st November 1888, in having, at the storming of the Ghorapher pass, Black Mountain, Hazara, been the first of the Khaibar Rifles to reach the crest.

APPENDIX N. Casualty Return, Hazara Field Force, 1888.

Corps.	OFFICERS.				NATIVE OFFICERS, WARRANT OFFICERS, NON-COMMISSIONED OFFICERS AND MEN.							FOLLOWERS.				REMARKS.
	Killed.	Died of wounds.	Wounded.	Died of disease.	Killed.	Died of wounds.	Wounded.	Died of disease.	Injured on service.	Missing.	Killed.	Died of wounds.	Wounded.	Died of disease.	Missing.	
2-1st Scottish, R. A.	1(a)	(a) Lieutenant Cleeve.
Northumberland Fusiliers	2	7(b)	..	2	(b) Band Master Wallace.
Royal Irish Regiment.	2	..	3	..	2(c)	(c) Two men fell over <i>khad</i> , of whom one died.
Royal Sussex Regiment	6	(d) Lieutenant Ewart.
Seaforth Highlanders	1(d)	1	4	
3rd Co., Sappers & Miners	1	
14th Sikhs	3	2	..	2	
24th Punjab Infantry	5	..	4	(e) Captain Beley, D.S.O.
25th " "	..	1(e)	
29th " "	3	(f) Colonel Crookshank, C.B.
34th Pioneers	..	1(f)	2	1(g)	2	(g) Subadar-Major Chatter Singh.
40th Bengal Infantry	1	3	
45th Sikhs	1	
3rd Sikhs	3	..	4	1	
4th Punjab Infantry	1(h)	3	(h) Captain Radford.
5th Gurkhas	1	..	4	
Khaibar Rifles	6	1	..	
Commissariat	5	
Telegraph	1	
TOTAL	..	2	3	..	18	5	42	7	9	..	2	..	5	1	..	

(Sd.) J. W. McQUEEN, Major-General,
Commanding Hazara Field Force.

NOTE.—Some of the casualties have been omitted in this return: for example, in 2-1st Scottish R. A., there was one gunner wounded, and in the 14th Sikhs there were 8 men wounded, besides one man who lost a hand by an accident while roadmaking. These are not shown in the return.—A. H. M.